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1. INTRODUCTION 
Tnis thesis will endeavour to ascertain the nature and extent 
of Sikh support for the British during the Indian "Mutiny" 
of 1857. It will analyse the importance of this support .. 
The thesis will maintain that without the active support of 
many of the Sikhs, all of northern India could have been lost 
to the British, at least temporarily. The attitude of Sikhs 
themselves, towards the British, and towards the "rebels," 
will also be investigated, particularly concepts of loyalty 
and collaboration. 
~1ch has been written about the Indian "Mutiny." The majority 
of works concern themselves with the whole of northern India. 1 
Other histories concentrate on those areas where mutiny and 
civilian rebellio~ were rife. 2 Yet others deal with the Punjab 
3 
as a whole. However, there exists a dearth of information 
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An important aim of this thesis is to redress some of the 
conclusions Domin reaches. 4 
It is pertinent that the position of Sikhs during the "Mutiny" 
be examined at this time for three main reasons. The first 
is the suspect ideology of Domin's work. Her quasi-Marxist 
viewpoint does not allow other interpretations. Furthermore, 
she places a great deal of emphasis on agrarian changes brought 
about by the British policy of integrating the British-controlled 
provinces into the capitalist world economy. This is perceived 
as a major factor in alienating the peoples of Oudh and the 
North Western Provinces, in particular. Conversely, she argues 
the non-enlightened land policies of the British in the Punjab 
resulted in the active support of the predominantly rural Sikhs. 
However, Eric Stokes and Thomas Metcalf5 take exception to the 
commonly held conclusion that it was British land tenure policy 
that decided the support or rebellion of the people of any 
particular area. Focussing on the North-Western Provinces 
they argue that high or low land rent assessments, and/or land 
transfers were not the overwhelming reason for the reactions 
of any particular group of people in 1857. 
4 
5 
Dolores Domin, India in 1857-59. 
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A Study in the Role of the 
Berlin, 1977. 
Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj. Studies in agrarian 
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London 1979. 
3 
As Stokes maintains, it is necessary to look beyond British 
land policies to such vagaries as the political motivations 
of the traditional elites. Loss of lord.ship rights was far 
6 
more important than the financial loss to many landholders. 
Traditional bonds of allegiance remained influential in 1857 
throughout northern India. This, we shall find out, was also 
the case in the Punjab. 
The second reason for this thesis is the virtual absence of 
discussion of the "Mutiny" in J.S. Grewal's New Cambridge 
History of India. 7 I believe 1857 was a period in the develop-
ment and evaluation of the Sikh panth that was undeniably of 
importance, and, as such, should be included in a study of 
Sikhs. 
The third main reason is the recent availability of the Punjab 
Mutiny Reports, which have been reprinted in two volumes, and 
are housed in the Canterbury university library. A further 
reason is the availability of the District Gazetteers and the 
Settlement Reports on microfilm, which makes it possible to 
research such a topic in New Zealand. However, such contemporary 




J.S. Grewal, New Cambridge History of India. The Sikhs of 
the Punjab. Cambridge University Press 1990. 
4 
towards their own good government, and how it benefits their 
subjects. They must be treated with due caution. 
In discussing Sikhs of any period, the problem of identification 
must be dealt with. When the British annexed the Punjab in 
1849 there was no precise meaning of the term Sikh. It applied 
to a variety of identities loosely grouped under the heading 
of Sikh. 8 In the mid-nineteenth century Sikhs generally were 
perceived by the British to be Khalsa Sikhs. They openly 
displayed the Khalsa symbols, were excellent horsemen, and 
had been a formidable enemy of the British in two recent wars. 
However, this gives the impression that Sikhs were a homogeneous 
group. This was not the case in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. Sikhs were neither a unified body, nor were they 
easily defined. While Khalsa Sikhs were the very visible face 
of Sikhdom, there were many other who called themselves Sikhs. 
Chapter three addresses the problem of identification of Sikhs 
in some detail. 
We shall notice that it is often difficult to differentiate 
between Sikhs on the one hand, and other Punjabis on the other. 
Most of the contemporary reports do not distinguish between 
the two, even in discussing such topics as the composition 
of the military forces. It was not until after the fall of 
8 
Richard Fox, Lions of the Punjab. California 1985, ppl08-112. 
9 
5 
Delhi that Khalsa Sikhs were inducted into the regular army, 
wherein all Sikh soldiers were required to wear Khalsa symbols. 
Until at least that time·it was more usual to refer to caste 
type than to religious affiliation. 
Sikhs9 occupied a unique position in the Punjab in that they 
constituted a minority of the population of the province, even 
in their homeland of the Lahore and Amritsar districts, the 
so-called Manjha, 10 yet held a privileged and powerful position, 
primarily due to having been favoured by the Sikh government 
of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. This situation was reinforced by 
the British, by a continuation of certain Sikh policies, and 
by the introduction of policies aimed at producing a stable 
yet productive rural community. 
Rural Sikhs, predominantly Jats, were skilled husbandmen and 
agriculturists, which earned them a position of importance 
and continuing favour. Their lack of prejudice at taking up 
the plough, which had inhibited the success and progress of 
such people of high social status as Rajputs, who would rather 
lose their land than demean themselves tilling the soil, 
Throughout the thesis I will use the term Sikh, referring to 
the general community of Sikhs, or Panth, unless I am discuss:ing 
a particular section of the Panth. 
10 
General Report on the Administration of the Punjab Territories, 
from 1854-55 to 1855-56 inclusive. Calcutta, 1856. p70. 
6 
endeared Sikhs to the British. Their skill in farming was 
matched by their martial skills. Sikhs could take to the swo~d 
as readily as to the plough. 
Variation and Complexity 
Individuals and groups within northern Indian society responded 
to the outbreak of mutiny in different ways. The incidence 
of rebellion, including civilian insurrection, was widespread 
throughout Oudh and the North Western Provinces, for instance, 
whereas there were only sporadic or half-hearted outbreaks 
in the Punjab. The nature of disturbances in the older 
provinces varied greatly from that in the Punjab. Furthermore, 
within the Punjab there was a variety of responses to the 
"Mutiny," dependent upon region, background, caste, race or 
'tribal' grouping, and even local antagonisms or old feuds. 
Particular responses to the "Mutiny" were also, to a degree, 
dependent upon British administrative and land policies of 
any given area. 
In the Punjab itself there existed manifold divisions, religious, 
social, economic and geographic. Although religious divisions 
at first appear straightforward, in practice they were not. 
Culture did not necessarily answer the dictates of religion .,11 
11 
P.H.M. Van den Dungen, The Punjab Tradition, Influence and 
Authority in Nineteenth Century India. London 1972. p36. 
7 . 
Amongst the major divisions of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs certain 
traditions and cultures cut across religion. For example, 
Jats, who constitute a large proportion of the population of 
rural Punjab, may have been Muslim, Sikh or Hindu. Religious 
practices, and social customs, differed from district to 
district, according to the variables of climate, geography, 
land fertility, land ownership, and so on. This goes to show 
that one cannot easily generalise about Sikhs. 
British Policy 
A common disli~e. and mistrust, of 'Purbiahs,' shared by 
Punjabis, particularly Sikhs who had fought against them in 
tha two Anglo-Sikh Wars, was a characteristic utilised by the 
British to further their own ends. 12 By emphasising ethnic, 
religious, cultural and social divisions the British found 
it easier to direct and control people and events. 
While the British held Sikhs in great respect, they were also 
very wary of their predilection for militancy and their martial 
skills. By continuing policies initiated by Ranjit Singh they 
hoped to keep Sikhspacified. In the years prior to the revolt 
the British also recruited Sikhs into the Military Police, 
the civilian police and into the army, that is the Punjab 
13 Irregular Frontier Force and Bengal Army. 
12 
13 
Purbiah was a common term in the Punjab for a Hindustani. 
Literally it means a person from the East. It was often 
used in a derogatory manner. 
Former Khalsa soldiers were not enlisted into these forces. 
8 
Early British land policy tended to favour the peasantry, while 
measures were taken to weaken the power base of the aristocracy. 
The British learnt from their mistakes in the North-Western 
Provinces where events and reacth6ns showed they had set the 
land revenue settlements far too high, and thereby alienated 
the rural masses. So, in the ensuing summary land settlements 
the British pitched the tax ratio relatively low, and implemented 
a number of policies aimed at benefitting the peasant 
proprietors, of whom a large proportion were Sikhs. 
Significance of Sikhs 
After the second Anglo-Sikh War the British introduced policies 
which reinforced by law the former privileged position of Sikh 
peasants. Because of their particular aspect of British policy 
Sikhs, having lost their independence just a decade before 
the "Mutiny" "were not forced by adverse circumstances to side 
against the colonial power. 1114 
In this thesis I maintain that, overall, the majority of Sikhs 
supported the British: of those who did not actively support 
the British, in the main they did not join the "rebels" against 
the British, and so they played a decisive role in the outcome 




support of the British, as the majority of Punjabis also were 
at least not actively against the British. As the British 
regained Delhi and control of the Punjab, the province was 
able to supply recruits for service in the still-rebellious 
provinces. In this manner the Punjab, including Sikhs, helped 
to bring the whole of northern and central India under the 
yoke of British rule once more. 
I also intend to discuss the exceptions to the loyal Sikhs, 
those Sikhs who chose to fight on the side of the "rebels" 
against the British, particularly in Delhi, and in the North-
Western Provinces. 
The penultimate chapter deals with Delhi and that city's 
importance in the outcome of the mutiny and of civilian rebellion. 
10 
2. THE PATTERN OF MUTINY 
Outbreak of Mutiny 
Rumblings of discontent had been discernible throughout northern 
India since 1856, but it took specific grievances to precipitate 
a full-scale mutiny. British authorities had tended to ignore, 
or at least regard as insignificant, all the signs of 
disaffection amongst sepoy regiments. There had been previous 
small-scale mutinies, or near-mutinies, such as that at Vellore 
in 1806. 
As the armed forces of British India steadily grew, European 
troops became vastly outnumbered by Indians, by almost seven 
1 to one. The troops of the Bengal Army often were sent to 
fight in far-flung reaches of the Empire. Lord Dalhousie's 
rampant annexation campaign was adding new territories to 
the British conquests in India throughout the late 1840s and 
1850s. In a statement delivered soon after his arrival, in 
1848, in India, Dalhousie reiterated the policy of the Govern-
ment regarding annexation by stating that when any opportunity 
presented itself of acquiring territory or revenue he would 
2 not be slow to take advantage. When he proclaimed the 
annexation of the Punjab on 29 March 1849 he was conformin.9 
to the prevalent views of the time. When, previously, the, 
1 
Michael Edwardes, Red Year. The Indian Rebellion of 1857. 




Bengal Army had been posted to remote areas the sepoys were 
paid batta, an extra field allowance for foreign service. 
Now that these distant lands were part of the British Empire, 
foreign service allowance was no longer applicable. This 
was one grievance among many that the Bengal sepoys began to 
entertain. 
I 
Further upsetting the high caste Hindu sepoys of the Bengal 
Army was the insistence, after November 1856, that sepoys must 
undertake upon enlistment to serve overseas. They believed 
that any travel beyond the Kala Pani, literally the Black Water, 
3 would destroy their caste. The new regulation was regarded 
~ as further evidence that the British intended to annihilate 
their religion. The presence of missionaries reinforced their 
fears of an official attempt to convert Hindus and Muslims 
to Christianity. The British were arrogant in their lack of 
response to dispel the sepoys' fears. 
However, by 1856, both Hindu and Muslim holy men helped to 
spread the spirit of disaffection amongst the civilian populace, 
while sepoys passed secret letters inciting members of other 
regiments to join their brothers in the good fight. 4 
3 
4 
Sitaram Pandey, From Sepo,y-':to Subedar, being the Life and 
Adventures of a Native Officer of the Bengal Army, written 
and related by himself, transl. by Col. Norgate, Lahore, 1873. 
Reprint Ed. James, London, 1970. pl57. 
'T'his is detailed in any history of the Indian Mutiny. See 
J.W. Kaye and G.B. Malleson, History of the Indian Mutiny 
of 1857-1858, 6 Vols., New Edition, London, 1896; T.R.E. Holmes, 
A History of the Indian Mu.tiny, London, 1883; and R.C. Majumdar, 
The Sepoy Mu.tiny and the Revolt of 1857, Calcutta, 1963. 
12 
After Dalhousie annexed the Punjab, the great bulk of British 
troops allocated to Bengal were concentrated in the Punjab, 
particularly along the western frontier of Peshawar. In 1856, 
out of the entire British garrison in India, of 45,000 men, 
16,000 were quartered in the Punjab. 5 The cream of British 
officers were transferred to the newly annexed territory and 
here, as in Oudh after its annexation, Dalhousie entrusted 
the forts, magazines, arsenals and treasuries to the sole guard-
ianship of Hindustani troops. 6 
Hindus anq Muslims feared for the very existence of their 
religion. Some sepoys believed the introduction of the new 
Enfield rifle, whose cartridges were bound in greased paper, 
using the fat of cows or pigs, was intended deliberately to 
undermine their religion. 
By February 1857 this news reached the 19th Native Infantry 
at Berhampore, who refused the cartridges, as they would defile 
the sepoys' caste and they would be regarded as outcasts by 
their co-religionists. For security reasons the sepoys were 
marched to Barrackpore and disarmed. 
Although incendiarryTibr~sbegan to break out mysteriously in 
many cant~nments in the early months of 1857, and discontent 
amongst sepoys was by now widespread, the British believed 
5 




the situation was in control, and would gradually calm down. 
Even in the Punjab the restlessness of the Bengal Army regulars 
was noticeable. There too, it was said that faqirs and maulvies 
were attempting to subvert the soldiers, and letters were 
circulated around the cantonments, urging the sepoys to mutiny. 7 
At Meerut, the largest station in India, and the strongest 
in numbers of European troops, the situation had deteriorated 
to the extent that the sepoys refused to use the hated new 
cartridges, or even the old cartridges they had used for years. 8 
Eighty-five sepoys were arrested, courtmartialled and imprisoned, 
sparking the mutiny of their fellow soldiers of the 3rd Cavalry, 
9 on 10 May, 1857. The sepoys then marched to Delhi before the 
British officers had gathered their wits to prevent them doing 
so. In Delhi they seized the fortress and arsenal. The small 
body of British soldiers in Delhi was not forewarned by the 
Meerut authorities of the impending danger, and was unable 
to prevent the mutinous sepoys from forcing their way into 
the royal palace, where they proclaimed a reluctant Bahadur 
Shah II, very old and almost blind, King of India. The Meerut 
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other mutineers continued to arrive in Delhi throughout the 
siege of the city. Delhi became the focus of the revolt to 
14 
the rebels, and the British in the Punjab also centred their 
strategies on the city. Delhi was most important, to the rebels 
and to the British. It was the gateway to the Punjab and the 
North-Western Frontier Province. He who controlled Delhi had 
the upper hand in 1857. Delhi became the focus of the revolt 
to the insurgents. From Delhi the conflagration rapidly 
engulfed Northern and Central India, with the storm centring 
on Oudh. 
After the Meerut mutineers had captured Delhi, the revolt spread 
to the Punjab, to the Ferozepur frontier and to the banks of 
the Sutlej River. 10 
The majority of the 45th Native Infantry, stationed in Ferozepur, 
mutinied briefly on 14 May, followed by a considerable portion 
of the 57th Native Infantry. However, the mutinous elements 
of both regiments were quickly suppressed due to the swift 
actions of the British. 11 The magazine was ordered to be 
destroyed to prevent the mutineers from gaining possession 
of the ammunition, and the remnants of the regiments were 
marched into the barrack square and disarmed. Within a few 
days they were disbanded by order of the Punjab government. 
10 
11 
Papers relating to the Mutiny in the Punjab in 1857, 
Parlia~ intary Papers, House of Commons, 1859. Vol 18. 
Ibid, p332. 
15 
Immediate measures were taken to strengthen the defences of 
the station, and all ferries were halted to disallow mutinous 
troops from other stations in the Doab from crossing the Sutlej 
into the Ferozepur District. 12 Already, the neighbouring 
districts Bhuttiana and Haryana were in revolt. 
General van Cortlandt raised a levy of Sikhs to support the 
British position in the district. Before the end of May 500 
men were in training. The general and his Sikh levy maintained 
law and order in Ferozepur District, although increasingly 
depressing news for the British was arriving from Delhi Division. 
On 17 and 18 June the inhabitants of the city of Ferozepur 
were disarmed in a bid to contain the populace. Furthermore, 
in order to preserve the peace of the district and as an example 
to others, a faqir, Sham Das, who had rebelled against the 
British, was captured and executed, along with several 
followers. 13 
After the outbreak of mutiny amongst the 9th Light Cavalry, 
and the 46th N.I. of the Sialkot, on 9 July, the British 
considered it no longer safe to leave the army in the hands of 
any Hindustani regiments in the Punjab. Orders were given 
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However, the 10th broke into mutiny and seized any horses 
available, and rode off to Delhi on 9 August. 15 They were 
unsuccessfully pursued. 
From Ferozepur mutiny in the Hindustani regiments did not 
develop from east to west in a planned manner. The next mutiny 
occurred at Hoti Mardan, in the Peshawar Division, the remotest 
Division in the Punjab, when the 55th N.I. rose. 16 The 
rebellious troops fled towards the Swat Hills, from whence 
they were ejected by the Akhund of Swat because of internal 
17 intrigues there. From there they fled to Kashmir, although 
most perished on the way, or were caught in Kashmir and returned 
to the British who promptly executed them in a way that hardly 
seems "civilised" to us today. They were all blown away from 
guns in front of the entire garrison. 18 Swift and summary 
punishment was intended by the British to deter further mutinous 
activity in the Punjab. 
With the exception of Delhi, Peshawar Division gave the British 
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17 · 
by a turbulent and warlike people," similar to those across 
the border in Afghanistan. 19 The districts of Kohat and Hazara 
were held by parts of the old Punjab Irregular Force, while 
the valley of Peshawar was maintained by a strong garrison 
of:the Bengal regular army. 
On 21 May, 1857, four out of five Bengal regiments still in 
the Peshawar cantonment were disarmed, against the protestations 
of their European officers who believed strongly in their 
20 loyalty. Contemporary and early twentieth century British 
historians maintained the frontier population supported the 
21 British in general. In the Punjab Mutiny Report of the 
Peshawar District, Major E.J. Lake stated that the chiefs 
and yeomen flocked in, due to the disarming of the sepoys in 
the area, and were enrolled on the side of the British, thereby 
h 1 ' t th th b d t 't' 1 t' 22 e ping o preserve e peace on e or er a a cri ica ime. 
However, it is apparent that the hill population, consisting 
predominantly of a variety of sub-sections of Pathans, and 
further s'outh of Biloches, was not fully supportive of the 
19 
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P.M.R. Vol I., Report from Major Edward John Lake, 
Commissioner and Superintendent, Trans-Sutlej States, to 
Robert Montgomery, Jud~ Jial Commissioner for the Punjab, 
5 January 1858. pl49. 
18 
British. But nor were they enamoured of the Hindustanis. 
Having been under a blockade at the beginning of the mutiny, 
they quickly saw the benefits of enlisting for service with 
the British, where they would be well-paid for the sort of 
activities which appealed to them. The new levies raised in 
this division were all accustomed to hill warfare. They guarded 
the ferries on the Indus River, and the main roads of the 
d . . d h d d d · 23 istrict, an t ey capture many eserters an mutineers. 
However, the frontier chiefs of Peshawar District, and their 
subjects, became restless by July. Doubts began to emerge 
regarding the ultimate success of the British. Landholders 
and chiefs were reluctant to contribute to the six percent 
public loan required by the British for war expenditure. Never-
theless, it was accomplished with additional benefits. The 
people enjoyed seeing the money-lenders have to pay, so they 
became interested in supporting the British cause. 24 Further-
more, they viewed the British as a better prospect than the 
far-off Delhi insurgents. 25 By the end of July most border 
communities, in disgrace mainly due to their plundering 
23 
P.M.R. Vol. II. p289. 
24 
Ibid. , p285. 
25 
Ahmed, p140. 
activities, tendered their submission to the British 
authorities. 
19 
The situation in Jullundur, in the Trans-Sutlej Division, 
differed from that of other military stations in the Punjab 
because the military authorities there disregarded the warnings, 
and the constant incendiary fires, and neglected the opportunity 
to disarm the troops at an early stage. 26 When the sepoys of 
the Jullundur Brigade erupted into mutiny on 7 June, the 
British authorities were completely unprepared for such an 
eventuality, even though they had heard of the uprisings that 
had already taken place at other stations. The Trans-Sutlej 
Division was a strategically important division as supplies 
and troops from the Punjab proper passed through the region 
to reach Delhi. There was a strong British presence in the 
division because it contained the forts of Phillour, Kangra, 
Nurpur and Brijwara, and the sanitoria of Dharmsala and 
Dalhousie. 27 It also contained the large Indian state of 
Kapurthala. The main body of mutineers was joined by the 3rd 
N.I. at Phillour on 8 June. The Raja of Kapurthala, an 
independent Sikh price, and his contingent, helped to prevent 
the mutineers from breaking open the jail, or plundering the 




Ibid, Vol I. pl41. 
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Parliamentary Papers, 1859. Vol 18. p339. 
20 
and the other independent Sikh chiefs against the expansion 
of Ranjit Singh, and in 1846 and 1848, the Sikh chiefs had 
aided the British in the Anglo-Sikh wars. The British allowed 
them to continue to rule their kingdoms or princedoms as 
autonomous regions. The Raja of Kapurthala was an important 
and influential leader in the Trans-Sutlej Division, so his 
support brought with it the support of other leading figures, 
and large numbers of well-trained troops. 29 The Kapurthala 
troops were augmented by levies of Daudputras from Leiah and 
a Sikh regiment raised in Jullundur by the "conquest-tenure 
j ag irdars • " These jagirdars had received their jagirs by way 
of having been actively loyal to the Sikh governments of Ranjit 
Singh and his successors. These forces helped keep the peace 
of the district. 30 The action of the military authorities was 
as weak after the rising as before.:;1,t. The pursuit of the 
mutineers was left too late, thereby enabling both groups of 
mutineers to succeed in attaining their goal, Delhi. 
On 25 June John Nicholson carried out the disarming of the 
33rd and 35th regiments of Native Infantry at Phillour, in 
d t t f th t . . . th T S tl . D' ' · Jl or er o preven ur er mu inies in e rans- u eJ ivision. 
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and Kangra, were tranquil due to early precautionary measures, 
32 and nightly patrols. Mixed levies were raised in Kangra 
District, as each district had to protect itself because the 
large number of reinforcements sent to Delhi had reduced the 
garrison of every station. 
Jhelum Division was not as strategically important as the Cis-
Sutlej Division, nor as politically valuable as the Lahore 'l0r 
Peshawar Divisions. However, the British authorities felt 
it was imperative to preserve the peace and tranquillity of 
the region because of its proximity to Kashmir, and because 
of the large number of restless races who dwelt in the valleys, 
h 'll d l . f th' d' · ' 33 i s an pains o is ivision. Many of these people were 
recruited by the British, who made good use of their martial 
skills. On 7 July part of the 14th N.I. mutinied. A probable 
cause was their fear of seeing a force of armed Europeans and 
Sikhs advancing on them, so they panicked and fled to their 
34 lines where they defended themselves. 
The mutiny at Sialkot, in the Lahore Division, was of utmost 
importance to the British as European officers and civilians 
were murdered. When the Movable Column had been formed, all 
troops stationed at Sialkot were withdrawn, with the exception 
32 
Parliamentary Papers, 1859. Vol 18. p341. 
33 




35 of the 46th N.I. and a wing of the 9th Light Cavalry. The 
9th Light Cavalry had heard of the outbreak of the 14th N.I. 
at Jhelum. The military police detachments who were supposed 
to back up the British failed to do so because of the Sikh 
Risaldar of the mounted police, and the Subedar of the infantry 
police, who encouraged the mutineers to plunder the treasury 
and set fire to all the documents and records in the district 
ff . 36 o ice. The mutineers fled to Delhi, but were pursued by 
Nicholson and apprehended before they reached their destination. 
Driven on to an island in the Ravi River by Nicholson's Movable 
37 Column, the rebels became hopelessly trapped. After a 
desperate fight they were annihilated; those who were not shot, 
with the superior Enfields of the British and their supporters, 
38 were drowned. 
At Mian Mir, just outside Lahore, the news of the destruction 
of the mutineers of the 46th N.I. caused the disarmed 26th 
NI. to be frightened and apprehensive. 39 Prompted more by fear 
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European officers. Then the entire regiment fled into open 
country whence they were pursued and, ultimately, killed. 
The Lahore Division was extremely important to the British 
23 
as it contained the religious and political capitals, Amritsar 
and Lahore, which were also the two largest commercial cities 
of the province. This division was the heart-land of the Sikhs. 
They owned 75 per cent of the total area of Amritsar, while 
40 
Muslims owned 25 per cent. The population of the Lahore 
Division was 33 per cent of the entire population of the Punjab. 
As a good proportion of the inhabitants were Sikhs, the British 
were interested in winning over this community, with favours 
and concessions before the outbreak of mutiny, and, during 
the uprising, by continuing to utilise it as a recruiting grourid 
for the armed forces (as Ranjit Singh's administration had 
done). The Sikh Jats of the Manjha, or upper portion of the 
Bari Doab, had formed the flower of the Sikh armies and these 
,well-trained and capable soldiers were admired also by the 
British. 41 The stalwart Sikhs of the Manjha "were wholly on 
the British side throughout" the uprising. 42 Some mutineers 
who had managed to escape from Mian Mir were seized by villagers 
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Leiah Division was completely calm throughout the crisis, except 
for a small, isolated incident in Main Wali in the District 
of Dera Ismail Khan. On 22 September a small portion of the 
9th Irregular Cavalry mutinied and then fled. 43 However, this 
was a minor matter, and the body of the 9th remained trustworthy. 
In the Kangarh District of Leiah the British authorities took 
immediate precautionary measures to forestall any rebellion, 
when civilian insurrection erupted in the neighbouring division 
of Multan. 
Civilian Rebellion 
When the British were seen by Sikhs and other Punjabis, to 
be weakened after four months of desperate fighting before 
Delhi, many civilians took advantage of the situation. 
Two major insurrections took place in the Punjab, when the 
people believed British rule was at an end. The first took 
place at Murri, the hill station in the Jhelum Division, on 
2 September, and the other occurred at Gugera, in the Multan 
Division, from 17 September until the end of October. Both 
these insurrections were staged by Muslims, and were based 
more on local and traditional conflicts than on a real desire 
to take on the British, and replace them with an elderly Muslim 
king. 
43 
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The unrest at Murri was suppressed swiftly by the British. 
The uprising which took place at Gugera spread throughout 
the district but not beyond the district, and did not include 
all of the district's inhabitants. 44 
Delhi was retaken by the British on 20 September, thereby with-
holding any assistance the Southern Bar rebels had expected. 
The last of the rebels were finally suppressed by the end of 
October. Both insurrections were limited-scale operations and 
took place in comparatively isolated:. areas. Neither of these 
civilian insurrections. involved any Sikh elements. There 
were, for reasons we shall discover, no major organised Sikh 
civilian uprisings in the Punjab. 45 However, it would be fair 
to state that, had the British failed to take Delhi when they 
did, many sections of the Sikh panth might have risen against 
them in their weakened state. 
44 
45 
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Delhi, 1974. ppl74-75. The Lakheragot of Kharrals, along 
with the Sials and the Langrials of the Multan District, 
actively collaborated with the British, in an essentially' 
local revenge-inspired goal. Major, pll. 
However, there were Sikhs among the rebels, especially in 
the city of Delhi, and outside the Punjab. 
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There were no more instances of mutiny or civilian rebellion 
in the Punjab after October of 1857. Delhi was in the hands 
of the British, whose power and prestige were fully restored. 
Since the British had proved themselves, and had emerged the 
victor, Punjabis, particularly Sikhs, including those awaiting 
the outcome, clamoured to enlist in the service of the British. 
Now the British could turn all their attention to putting down 
rebellion wherever it existed throughout Northern and Central 
India. 
This chapter has endeavoured to sketch the main outlines of 
the revolt of 1857 as it affected the Punjab. Before we begin 
an analysis of;these events, and in particular the Sikh role 
in them, it is necessary to consider a vital question which 
we have left untouched. To whom, exactly, are we referring 
when we speak of "the Sikhs"'? An answer to this question will 
involve a brief excursus into the history of Sikhism in the 
centuries preceding 1857. 
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3. SIKHS AND SIKHISM 
When endeavouring to ascertain the actions and reactions 0f 
a group of people to a particular event, or series of events, 
one must first of all define that group of people. This poses 
numerous difficulties with regard to Sikhs because there are 
significant divisions within the Sikh Panth, 1 and because of 
the changes the Panth has undergone since its inception. 
At no time were Sikhs a clearly definable, monolithic group. 
Nor are the categories within the Sikh Panth easily definable. 
The fundamental issue of definition is further confused by 
the term "Sikhism," which is often used to describe the Khalsa 
as the essential form of the Sikh tradition. For others, the 
term is used to describe a broader identity which includes 
the earlier centuries of Sikh development, often referred to 
as the Nanak-panth, after Guru Nanak. 
But there were further sub-divisions besides Khalsa and non-
Khalsa. There also exist those who observe much of the Khalsa 
discipline without formally taking initiation, and yet others 
who are able to be defined as neither Sikh nor Hindu, and those 
who observe the Khalsa tradition but cut their hair. 2 
1 
2 
The term Panth will be used here, as there is no suitable 
English translation. Panth means community, or path or way. 
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These differentiations are inevitable in a vital religion, 
which has had to adapt to changing conditions, such as Mughal 
persecution. 
A popular Sikh calendar displays at a glance the religious 
origins, and symbolically presents alterations in direction 
that occurred during the leadership of the ten personal Gurus. 
Further changes took place after the death of the tenth Guru. 
The founder of Sikhism, Guru Nanak, sits cross-legged at the 
top of the calendar, a halo above him to signify his holy nature 
He is the largest figure on the calendar, denoting his particular 
importance. The next four Gurus stand beneath him, a little 
smaller in stature. These four Gurus continued Nanak's 
teachings, and were peaceful as was Nanak. Underneath stand 
four more Gurus, who represent a change in direction, for they 
did not continue the message of peace. The sixth Guru, Hargov.ind, 
~s a warrior and is shown with a quiver of arrows on his back. 
These Gurus, and their followers, were persecuted by the Mughals 
for their religious convictions. At the bottom of the calendar 
stands a solitary Guru, the tenth and last, Guru Gobind Singh. 
As he declared there would be no more Gurus, because all Sikhs 
3 are Gurus, there follows at the very bottom the most important 
3 
Gobind Singh's sons predeceased him, so he had no successor 
on whom to pass the Guruship. Although the first Gurus were 
appointed,the Guru line descended through inheritance 
with the last four. W.H. McLeod, Early Sikh Tradition, Oxford, 
1980. p4. 
Guru, the Guru Granth Sahib, also known as the Mi Granth, 
the Eternal Guru, the Holy Book of Sikhdom. 4 
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As in other religions, great consequence is placed on the 
foundations of their religion by Sikhs, more particularly perhaps 
as Sikhs comprise a minority of the demographic make-up of 
the Punjab, even in the Sikh heartland, the Manjha. 
The Sikh Religion: Its Origins and Its Changes 
The Sikh faith was founded by Baba Nanak, about 1500. Born 
into an orthodox Khatri family in Lahore District, he had not 
intended to found a new religion separate from Hinduism, but 
merely to reform it, and to put a different emphasis on it. 
When he died in 1539 Nanak bequeathed to the next appointed 
Guru a host of teachings in the form of beautiful religious 
5 poems and hymns. These scriptures were later collated by the 
fifth Guru, together with the teachings of other Gurus, into 
the Granth Sahib. Nanak 1 s reforms were not social or political, 
but laid a broad base of religious and moral purity for his 
numerous band of disciples to follow. 
Guru Nanak accepted such important Hindu doctrines as trans-
migration of souls, and the law of karma, but he rejected 
idol worship anGl preached that there exists only one God, 
not a multiplicity as in popular Hinduism. Although commonly 
4 
5 
Robin Jeffrey, What's Happening to India?, New York, 1986. p53. 
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Manchester University Press, 1984. pl. 
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it has been held that Sikhism is a blend of Hindu and Muslim 
beliefs, it was, however, a departure from the two. Affinities 
with Sufi concepts, more particularly, rather than with Islam 
in general, were apparent, but these were, at most, of little 
import. Although monotheism and the omnipresence of God would 
appear to have derived from the Sufism of Guru Nanak's day 
these doctrines were also a characteristic of Sant belief. 
Some of Guru Nanak's teachings were in direct conflict with 
those of the Sufis, such as his acceptance of the doctrine 
f k d t . t' 6 o arma an ransmigra ion. 
For Guru Nanak "conventional Hindu belief and Islam were not 
regarded as fundamentally right but as fundamentally wrong. 
The two were to be rejected ••... True religion lay beyond 
7 these two systems." 
Unlike followers of Islall\.': Nanak believed in rebirth. He taught 
that salvation lay in escaping the cycle of birth and rebirth, 
and becoming one with the creator. To achieve salvation Nanak 
emphasised the need for internal meditation. The worldly 
problem of the cycle of transmigration could be answered by 
focussing on the divine Name, or nam. Only in practising 
nam simaran, "remembrance of the Name," is one able to receive 
the truth from Akal Purakh, the Creator and Sustainer. 8 Yet 
6 
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Nanak was no ascetic, as he held that men and women must 
continue to live normal lives. A disciplined worldliness 
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was the way to liberation of the soul. Accordingly, he stressed 
the desire for "piety and practical activity:" 9 appropriate 
virtues for the Punjab of the nineteenth century as much as 
for that of the sixteenth century. 
All exterior forms of religion, rituals, ceremonies, sacred 
languages and the ubiquitous distinctions were to be 
rejected by Guru Nanak, as they had been by the Sants of 
Northern India. The Sant religion was a synthesis of three 
main religious movements which had dissented from the mainstream 
religious beliefs of Hindus and Muslims, 10 although Muslim 
b 1 . f h d t t . 1 . fl ll e ie s a a mos a margina in uence. The Sants regarded 
all outward acts of piety as worthless, and so differed from 
the large Bhakti tradition with which it is often identified, 
and from Nath doctrine, which advocated the practice of hatha-
yoga and stressed austerity. The Sants' devotion was an 
interior one which rejected withdrawal from the world. Guru 
Nanak inherited this Sant tradition, which rejected both Hindu 
and Muslim sectarian notions as incorrect and ultimately futile, 
and expanded and re-interpreted it according to his own 
personality and experience. Nanak's hymns, or bani, present 
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than the simple message of the Sants, and yet accessible to 
all. Nanak's bani have survived as a living faith, as valid 
in 1857 as in 1500. 12 The greatness of Guru Nanak lay in his 
ability to "integrate a disparate set of doctrines, and to 
express them with clarity and beauty. 1113 The first Guru's 
followers continued his pattern of devotion and instruction. 
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His nine successors, known by the title Guru, each contributed 
to the development of the new faith. 14 The third Guru, Amar 
Das, preserved the infant Panth from declining into a sect 
of quietists and ascetics. He introduced the manji system 
of supervision, from which it is widely accepted, the masand 
15 system later developed. This system of deputies, who were 
authorised to act on the Guru's behalf, was intended to cope 
with the increasing numbers in the Panth. 
In accordance with Nanak's teachings, regarding caste 
distinctions, Amar Das institutionalised the compulsory practice 
of inter-dining, when assembled at a dharam-sala or gurdwara. 16 
Guru Arjan, the fifth successor to Nanak, was more of an 
administrator than his predecessors. It was he who collected 
12 
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and arranged their writings, as he was a settled man unlike 
the previous Gurus and disciples who had wandered throughout 
Northern India, preaching what they understood of their 
religion. Guru Arjan gave his increasing numbers of followers 
a civil organisation and a written rule of conduct. The 
compilation by Arjan of Nanak's works, the writings of the 
intermediary Gurus, and Arjan's own prolific contributions, 
were completed in 1604, and formed the Sikh scriptures, the 
Adi Granth. 
Ritual and administrative measures taken by these early Gurus 
ensured the continuing existence of the Nanak-panth, and enabled 
it to withstand the changes it was to experience. 
For the first ~undred years Sikhism embodied peace and 
meditation, as eloquently displayed in the modern Sikh 
17 calendar. These were relatively placid years, mainly in 
the reign of the greatest of the Mughal emperors, Akbar, 1542-
1605, famous for his religious tolerance. However, during 
the seventeenth century external influences began to make 
inroads, eventually resulting in a;greatly altered Panth. 
Such developments add to the difficulty of identifying Sikhs. 
Following Akbar's death the Panth encountered mounting Muslim 
persecution. In tune with the turbulent times in which he 
and subsequent Gurus, lived, the sixth Guru, Hargobind, was 
more a martial leader than religious reformer. The militancy 
17 
Jeffrey, p5 2: 
of the Panth at this time was also due to the growing 
predominance of Jats who retained their cultural attributes 
of uncut hair, and skill at husbandry, as well as skilled 
horsemanship and martial prowess. 
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Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth and last personal Guru, bestowed 
upon his disciples a distinct political existence, and inspired 
them with the des~re to be socially free and nationally 
independent. He had inherited a double mission, to free his 
people from the oppressive bigotry of Mughal rule under the 
Emperor Aurangze4 and to arrange the death of his father, 
the ninth Guru, Tegh Bahadur, on the orders of Aurangzeb, 
in 16 7 5. Under the leadership of Gobinti Singh commenced the 
long struggle between the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs and the Muslim 
governors of Sirhind, a part of the Aurangzeb's persecution of 
the new religion. In Sirhind, Gobind Singh's wife and children 
18 
were murdered about 1700, seven years before the death of 
Aurangzeb, and a year after that,in 1708, Guru Gobind Singh 
was assassinated. 
Before he died Gobind Singh had already established the 
institutions ~hich would keep the religion alive and protect 
Sikhs; he declared the line of personal Gurus ended, the 
functions of the Guru to be vested jointly in the community 
18 
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of believers and the scriptures, 19 and he formally founded 
the Khalsa, initiating the most significant change in direction. 
In this atmosphere of violence and religious fanatacism Gobind 
Singh transformed the Panth from a passive sect into a militant 
brotherhood with a common objective, that of resisting Muslim 
domination and persecution. He named this the Khalsa, literally 
meaning pure, but also signifying the liberated or chosen 
20 people. The enthronement by Gobind Singh of the Adi Gran th 
as the Eternal Guru was also a reaction against Muslim 
persecution, and was intended to thwart enemies who endeavoured 
to subvert the religion by installing a puppet Guru, or by 
using other devious methods to gain control of the Sikh minions. 
In forming the Khalsa, Gobind Singh successfully fused a 
military discipline onto a religious foundation. 21 He found 
it necessary to institute a disciplined order to overcome 
internal administrative problems. The Guru· . needed to terminate 
the power of the regional supervisers, or masands, who 
administered pastoral matters and tithe collection, as the 
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assistance the system was introduced whereby the Sikhs who 
remained under the direct supervision of the Guru were 
collectively known as Khalsa, and the remainder were entrusted 
22 to the masands. While this had worked satisfactorily for 
some years, by the time of the tenth Guru, many masands had 
become corrupt, and were overstepping their authority.· So 
Gobind Singh removed them and brought all Sikhs under his 
direct guardianship. 
On the traditional Baisakhi Day of 1699 Guru Gobind Singh 
inaugurated the Khalsa. He introduced the concept of the 
five Ks, or panj kakke, and a distinctive style of initiation 
into the Khalsa. All who accepted this initiation, which 
took the form of a baptism ceremony, had to swear allegiance 
to a specific code of behaviour. 23 This mass baptism called 
the pahul, was a symbolic ritual, which included the sharing 
of a mixture of sugar and water stirred with a double-edg~d 
sword, to denote both the egalitarian and the military character 
of Khalsa Sikhism. 24 Only after he had undergone pahul 
initiation could a Sikh bear the title Singh, meaning lion. 
The baptised Guru Gobind took the name Singh, stressing the 
martial aspects of the Khalsa. 
22 
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Those Sikhs who had been initiated into the Khalsa were known 
as amrit-dhari, Sikhs who had taken amrit. They were required 
to maintain a particular outward appearance, certain social 
obligations, and ritual observances. This code of conduct 
was known as Rahit, and its records are rahit-namas. 25 Another 
term, which was frequently synonymous with amrit-dhari, was 
kes-dhari, or one who has uncut hair. 26 However, there were 
numerous Sikhs with uncut hair who were not initiated members 
of the Khalsa. Kes-dhari Sikhs comprised a large section 
of the Panth. A third group who revered the Gurus and practised 
nam simaran, but did not become initiated into the Khalsa, 
were known as Sahaj-dhari Sikhs. 27 Applied during the 
eighteenth century, sahaj refers to the term Guru Nanak used 
to describe the state of ultimate bliss achieved through the 
practice of nam simaran. 28 Sahaj-dhari Sikhs generally 
originated from the Khatri/Arora section of the Panth. Further 
confusing the issue of defining Sikhs, Khatris and Aroras 
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The smoking of a hookah was regarded as a Muslim practice, 
and as such wast, be forbidden. This prohibition came 
to_ include all smoking. Ibid., pp32-3. 
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30 Hind11s , or even as both. Unlike Khalsa Sikhs, Sahaj-dhari 
Sikhs were not visibly distinguishable from their Hindu 
neighbours. They remained loyal to Nanak-panth concepts and 1 
while they regarded themselves as Sikhs 1 their identity was 
more obscure than that of baptised Sikhs. 31 
From the outset Gobind Singh intended the Khalsa to be an 
outwardly distinctive order. The importance of visible identity 
was emphasised, making it no longer possible to be anonymous 
or hidden. This set Khalsa Sikhs apart from Hindu society, 
and united the Khalsa Panth in their common code and goals. 
Five symbols were to be worn or carried by the Panth, the 
so-called five Ks, or panj kakke. They are: Kes, to wear 
the hair and beard uncut: kangha, to carry a wooden comb: 
kach, to wear shorts, which was part of a contemporary soldier's 
attire; kara, to wear a steel bangle; and kirpan 1 to carry 
32 
a sword, or dagger. These items left no doubt regarding 
the military aspects of the Khalsa, three of which, kach, 
kara and kirpan, were part of a soldier's equipment. 
The five Ks also reflect the customs of the largest section 
of the Panth, that is Jats. Jat customs and cultural patterns 
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Khalsa Panth. Uncut hair was a Jat custom, which had been 
observed by Hindu and Muslim Jats also. The bearing of arms, 
represented by carrying a knife or a dagger, was a ... :Jat tcust:om 
as well. 33 
The name Sikh means learner, thus indicating the nature of 
Guru Nanak's religious instruction. The ten Gurus were Khatris, 
of a merchant caste, and all resided in villages in Central 
Punjab. These villages contained a large proportion of Jats. 
The cast origins of the Gurus, and their rural homes, were 
significant in the development of their following. 34 From 
early on the followers of the Gurus were Jats to a great degree, 
so the Sikh leadership was from the mercantile community while 
h f 11 . f h ' 't 35 Kh t ' t e o owing was rom t e agrarian comrnuni y. a ris 
traditionally filled the role of teachers of Jats. 
During the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
Jats gained a preponderance in the Panth, that increased after 
the founding of the Khalsa. The Jat custom of wearing the 
hair uncut and their militant traditions coincided with the 
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The Gurus had taught that hard work and enterprise were as 
necessary for salvation as meditation and prayer. This held 
great appeal for industrious Jats. 36 The Jats of the ~lnjab 
originated from a pastoral people, whose outstanding 
characteristic was an "absence of social, or economic, 
stratification. 1137 As they moved from Sind through Multan 
into the Punjab they changed from pastoralists to peasant 
cultivators. Thence, they advanced economically, and gained 
political supremacy. However, this did not lead them to assert 
claims to Khatri status. This was due to the egalitarian 
message of Sikhism. Furthermore, such claims would have been 
inimical to husbandry and to the development of thrift. 38 As 
a rule, Sikh Jats stayed out of the hands of the banias, or 
Hindu money-lenders. Any land transferred was for convenience, 
or to raise money from investment in trade, or sometimes for 
unproductive purposes sucha6.ma~riage ceremonies. Most of 
the alienated land remained within the community. 39 
36 
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The Gurus' rejection of caste status was significant in 
attracting Jats, with their egalitarian tradition, to the Panth. 40 
However, caste distinctions infiltrated the Panth, despite 
the promotion of equality as a basic premise of the Sikh 
religion: 41 "Together they (the Khalsa) would constitute a 
single caste, all eating from the same vessel and all united 
in the same resolve. 1142 The anticaste emphasis referred to 
access to spiritual deliverance, and to the sangats, or 
congregations. The convention introduced by the third Guru, 
that required members of a sangat, regardless of caste or 
gender, to dine together at the dharam-sala or gurdwara, was 
43 
called the langar. This was intended to prevent caste 
being recognised in the gurdwaras. However, in practice, in 
everyday life, the complete removal of caste identity was 
not demanded, nor adhered to. Within the Panth caste 
continued to be recognised for such traditional purposes as 
marriage alliances and family affiliations and was significantly 
influential in the political life of the Panth. 44 The major 
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in rural Punjab. 45 Jats made up the largest section, having 
predominated since the early years of the Gurus. The other 
caste divisions were the clerical and commercial castes, the 
Aroras and Khatris, and the artisan castes, such as Ramgarhias, 
or carpenters. Those occupying the lowest status were the 
ex-Untouchables or Harijans, sometimes called Mazhbi Sikhs. 
Caste cut across religious boundaries, for, though Sikh Jats 
seldom married Hindu Jats, the other three categories of Sikhs 
did intermarry Hindus of the same caste. 46 
This adherence to traditional caste status tends to undermine 
any efforts to determine. a Sikh identity. Hindu members 
of the same caste often looked upon their Sikh counterparts 
as " ' d h h .. d 1· . 1 ' t' 1147 Hin us w o ave Joine a po itica associa ion. Guru 
Gobind Singh's efforts to obliterate caste distinctions were 
no more successful than his predecessors'. 
Further divisions occurred within the Panth, if one includes 
an assortment of splinter groups and sects who claimed descent 
from Guru Nanak's elder son, Siri Chand, 48 Akalis and Shahids, 
both especially enthusiastic Khalsas, and Nirmalas, an order 
45 








of scholar Sikhs. 49 Doubtful recruits included the Nirankaris 
and the Namdharis, who preached respectively a return to pure 
Nanak-panthi principles, and a reinvigorated and rejuvenated 
Khalsa. 50 
With the termination of the line of personal Gurus, the function 
of the Guru was vested in the Adi Granth, which became a channel 
of communication between God and man, and the Panth. These 
modifications did not signify a departure from, but more a 
supplement to, Guru Nanak's teachings which continued to be 
the substance of Sikh belief and bound together the comparatively 
11 . 51 sma community. The tenets of the Khalsa, in the form of 
rahit namas, were consolidated during the eighteenth century. 
Many European observers regarded all Sikhs as Khalsa Sikhs, 
seemingly ignorant of the existence of other Sikhs, due to 
52 the wearing of the Khalsa Symbols. By the early nineteenth 
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Sikhs comprised just 14 per cent of the population of the 
Punjab by 1850. Even in the heartland of Lahore, Amritsar 
and Ludhiana Sikhs still formed only a minority. Talbot,.p32. 
See Ganda Singh (Ed.), Early European Accounts of the Sikhs, 
Calcutta, 1962, for a collection of reports by these eighteenth 
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the views of his predecessors, acknowledging the ascendance 
of the Khalsa Sikhs, in the Panth. But, he also noted the 
existence of Sahaj-dhari Sikhs, whom he called Khalsa Sikhs. 54 
During the 1840s Joseph Cunningham had firsthand experience 
of the Sikhs. In his work on Sikh history he stressed the 
predominance of the Khalsa identity amongst Sikhs, and wrote 
that there was an obvious distinction between Sikhs and Hindus, 
referring to the outwardly visible Khalsa Sikhs. 55 
Throughout the eighteenth century the Panth continued to gain 
in strength as the Mughal F.mpire was on the wane, and the Punjab 
endured invasions by Persians and Afghans. After Gobind Singh 1 s 
death, as no descendant successor was available, Banda Bahadur, 
no relation to Gobind, was the dominant choice because of his 
early successes against the Mughal rulers in the Punjab. During 
the widespread rural unrest that accompanied the waning of 
Mughal power Banda Bahadur emerged as the new Sikh leader. 
But he was executed in 1716, and the leadership was inherited 
by the Panth and the Eternal Guru, the Adi Granth. The Afghan 
invasions finally eliminated Mughal rule in the Punjab. In 
1764 the holy temple of ~nritsar was rebuilt, having been razed 
by Ahmad Shah. The Akali Sikhs appointed themselves the armed 
guardians of the Golden Temple at Amritsar, the heart of 
Sikhdom. 56 They adopted arms as their profession and, under 
54 
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Maharaja Ranjit Singh, the "lion of the Punjab," who built 
and ruled a vast kingdom from 1801-1839, they formed a prominent 
section of his very capable army. 
Ahmad Shah helped to prepare the way for the establishment 
of Sikh authority. The tough, flexible military' organisations 
known as misls grew out of this period of anarchy in the 
eighteenth century. These independent groups of Sikhs were 
bound in a flexible confederation by their rural origins, by 
the bonds of common religious affiliation, and by their 
. t. t 57 opposi ion o a common enemy. 
These armed confederacies took advantage of the power vacuum 
to carve ou•t petty states for themselves. The Phulkian Sikhs58 
and other chiefs began to establish kingdoms from the ruins 
of the Mughal Empire. 59 The House of Patiala, and other small 
kingdoms, were founded at this time, many of which remained 
independent territories under the protection of the British, 
during Ranjit Singh's rule, and after the annexation of the 
Punjab. 
In theory there were twelve misls, each covering a different 





The Phulkian Sikhs established themselves in the Cis-Sutlej 
States. 
Ludhiana District Gazetteer, p22. 
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60 authority of Dal Khalsa. In practice the organisation of 
misls was much more adaptable than this. Internecine warfare 
eruped amongst the misls once the immediate threat posed by 
the Afghan invaders, who had replaced the Mughals as the common 
foe, was not so urgent. 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh 
The advent of the "one-eyed lion" of the Punjab, Ranjit Singh, 
brought an end to the feuding among the misls by establishing 
a powerful if short-lived monarchy. At the tender age of fifteen 
he became leader of the Shukerchakia misl, and, to reinforce 
this position, he married twice into the family of Jai Singh 
Kanaihya in the Upper Bari Doab, and into the family of Kamar 
Singh Nakkai in.southern Lahore. Already he had been advantaged 
by his father who had left him a large area-of well-administered 
land, from mid Rechna to mid Sind Saugar Doabs, and 5,000 well-
61 armed, mounted cavalry. Gradually Ranjit Singh united the 
opposing Sikh factions and pacified the Punjab. While he was still 
a very young man he established the Kingdom of Lahore in 1801, 
creating a vast Sikh empire from this political base situated 
in the region's central tracts. Known to Sikhs as the Manjha, 
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kingdom, Amritsar. Commanded by the famed fortress of Gov:indgarh, 
the city of Amritsar houses the most holy of places of worship 
for Sikhs, the Golden Temple. 62 By the time Ranjit Singh died 
in 1839 his empire extended from Peshawar to the River Sutlej, 
and from Kashmir almost as far as Sind. 
In 1809,·Ranjit Singh a treaty with the British at Amritsar 
in which he agreed to concede the River Sutlej as the border 
between his Sikh empire and the Cis-Sutlej states, whose Sikh 
rulers resisted Ranjit and had thence requested British 
protection against attack by his formidable army. The East 
India Company established a cantonment at Ludhiana following 
the signing of the treaty, and Ranjit Singh remained a friend 
and ally of the British. Hereafter, the Sikh chiefs of the 
independent states, and the other Cis-Sutlej chiefs, actively 
supported the British, including throughout the crisis in 1857. 63 
Ranjit consolidated his power, by his own ingenious tactics, 
although seemingly arbitrary and often cruel by British 
standards, and by the strategic use of his army, whose soldiers 
were well-disciplined and obtained by voluntary enlistment. 64 
Under Ranjit Singh's rule every Sikh, Khalsa or otherwise, 
enjoyed all the privileges of Khalsa citizenship, including 
62 






exemption from taxation. However, he was careful not to offend 
Muslim and Hindu subjects. Much admired by Sikhs, Ranjit made 
the Sikhs, with a population of barely half a million, into 
one of the strongest and most powerful states in India. Yet 
he had established no schools, courts nor jails, for his methods 
were more personal and direct, nor were any public utility 
works carried out during his reign. 
Maharaja Ranjit Singh was held in such high regard by the Sikh 
Panth that, even after his demise, they were influenced by 
his loyalties, particularly his alliance with the British. 
Throughout his reign Ranjit Singh had been a friend and ally 
of the British. His kingdom was regarded as the fulfilment 
of the Khalsa ideal. Beliefs, which were in opposition to 
the teachings of the Gurus, had surfaced in the Panth, but 
did nothing to undermine its strength and unity. 65 
Due to the efficient use of his highly disciplined army, Ranjit 
was extremely successful in all his battles. The real strength 
of his armed forces lay in its infantry and artillery, both 
groups being trained by Rohilla Afghans in the service of Ranjit 
Singh. These troops, well-turned out, excellent horsemen, 
and displaying the Khalsa insignia, presented the public face 
of the Khalsa. This was so much so that many observers believed 
all Sikhs to be of his dominant group. Impressions of Sikhs 
65 
McLeod, The Evolution of the Sikh Community, p54. 
given in the reports written by Europeans in the first part 
of the nineteenth century were based on sightings of these 
well-trained units. 
Ranjit Singh began employing European officers in the 1820s. 
Towards the end of his reign nearly half of his army, which 
included a large number of non-Sikh Punjabis, was trained 
66 
according to European methods. 
49 
Ranjit had given his personal attention to revenue administration 
and trade in his extensive dominions. He revived prosperity 
in the Punjab, and extended state patronage to all the important 
sections of the population. Sikhs formed the dominant element 
in the ruling class, and had the largest share in jagirs assigned 
by Ranjit and his successors. 67 Hindus and Muslims came to 
form a substantial section of the ruling class also. Sikhs 
received a much larger share of revenue-free land, but not 
at the expense of Hindus or Muslims. 68 Nevertheless, a vestige 




It is likely that, during the settled times throughout Ranjit 
Singh's rule, and up until the Anglo-Sikh wars, when Sikh 
dominion was powerful and extensive, many Non-Khalsa Sikh~ 
took to displaying the outward symbols of the Khalsa. This 
was a golden era in Sikh history, and a time for all Sikhs 
to be proud. Persecution had been replaced by privilege. 
However, not all Sikhs were content with the dominance of 
Khalsa Panth. Two sects, discussed briefly earlier in this 
chapter, the Nirankaris and the Namdharis, originated during 




After Maharaja Ranjit Singh 
After Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, the Punjab again deteriorated 
into a fierce scramble for power. The court at Lahore became 
divided, the power play at the top brought in the fractious 
nobility, and the court could not prevent the Sikh army from 
clamouring for war with the British, who were pressing against 
the Punjab's borders. 
Even the squabbles which developed within the Khalsa following 
the death of Ranjit did not immediately affect the Panth's 
sense of identity. 
War broke out between the formidable Sikh army and the British 
in 1846. After the defeat of the Sikhs, the East India Company's 
armyadvdnced the Punjab's frontier from the Sutlej to the Beas 
River, and the British occupied Lahore where a British Resident 
was established, but the Punjab proper was not annexed. 
The Second Anglo-Sikh war of 1848-49 stemmed from the reluctance 
of the British to annex the Punjab. However, after the decisive 
defeat of the Sikh army in 1849 the British annexed the entire 
province. 69 The British had been impressed by the formidable 
strength of the opposition of the Sikh army. The martial prowess 
of their enemy fitted well with the current British theory 
of martial races. 
69 Sitaram, pl56. 
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Several decades of relative peace under the auspices of Ranjit 
Singh resulted in an increase of population, which placed extra 
pressure on the fertile plains. The disbandment of the Khalsa 
further aggravated the situation. The British annexation of 
the province proved a shattering blow for the Sikh community 
on the whole, especially for the former Khalsa soldiers, who 
now found themselves unemployed. The British did not induct 
Sikhs, Khalsa or otherwise, into the Indian Army until 1851. 
Even then they were slow to join up, mainly because of the 
bigoted attitude of high caste Hindus in the armed forces, 
and because of the suspicious and unwilling stance of the 
British officers themselves. Former Khalsa soldiers were not 
trusted enough to be enlisted into the regular army until late 
1857, when the British needed all the support they could get 
when bogged down before Delhi. 
Under the leadership of Maharaja Ranjit Singh the Khalsa had 
attained great standing. But political success and material 
prosperity led to a weakening of Sikh traditions, predominantly 
of Khalsa rituals and customs, and a subsequent blurring of 
differentiation between Hindus and some Sikhs. After 
annexation this situation had developed sufficiently to under-
mine the position of strength previously held. Furthermore, 
52 
under British rule it confused divisions between Sikhs and 
Hindus for the purpose of policy making. 70 
70 
In census reports, which didn't start till 1871-72, Sikhs 
often were returned as Hindus. Frequently historians have 
concluded from this that Sikhs were not a homogeneous group, 
bound together by their religion and history, but were, in 
fact a Hindu sect, until the 1880s when there was a flowering 
of Sikh restoration. However,this concept is, at the least, 
questionable. During Ranjit Singh's rule, Sikhs, especially 
Sikh Jats, were the most privileged section of the community. 
After annexation the British were at pains to uphold this 
situation for the majority of the Sikh panth, with the exclusion 
of the ex-Khalsa soldiers. More detail, regarding the 
situation the former Khalsa soldiers found themselves in, 
follows·in Chapter 5. 
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4 . LAND ISSUES 
Geographical Features 
The ~~njab was a predominantly rural province, pastoral and 
agricultural, so land fertility, levels of rainfall, climatic 
factors and experimentation with crops were important. 
The Punjab covers such a vast area that it accommodates a 
variety of terrain types. In the mountainous areas of the 
north-east, which include the Kangra and Simla regions, monsoon 
rain fell abundantly, also watering the sub-montaine areas 
of Sialkot, Gurdaspur, Hoshiarpur and Ambala. 1 This enabled 
rich crops of sugar-cane, cotton and wheat to be grown. These 
densely populated areas had few large landowners. 
1'he Central Plains of Jullundur, Amritsar, Lahore and Ferozepur 
also received large amounts of rain. Ferozepur, the furthest 
south of these districts, was the driest in this part of the 
Punjab. It consisted mainly of scrub and semi-desert, and 
urgently required the less random benefits of canal irrigation. 
It would receive such irrigation when the Bari Doab and the 
Sirhind Canals were completed in 1861 and 1889 respectively. 
Meanwhile wells and inundation canals supplemented the rainfall. 
This region was heavily populated and cultivated in small. 
2 parcels of land. 
1 
2 




To the south-east and south-west of the Central Plains, the 
regions were arid and poor. The south-east contained the barren 
famine tracts of Rohtak and Hissar. 3 In the south-west the 
sparsely populated regions of Multan and Jhang received very 
little rainfall. The fertility of this region depended on 
inundation canals to a great degree. These canals, which 
existed throughout the south-west, were empty in winter, and 
ran with water, fed by the rivers, from April to October when 
4 they were much needed. The only alternative method of 
irrigation in this area was by the use of wells, which were 
difficult and unsatisfactory. Under both Sikh and British rule 
attempts had been made to maintain and extend facilities for 
irrigation. In Multan Sawan Mal, the Sikh ruler after Ranjit 
Singh, had had the old inundation canals repaired and new ones 
constructed. 5 
overall, conditions in the south-west were more conducive to 
a nomadic and pastoral life than to settled agricultural pursuits. 
3 
These districts were in Haryana which was not strictly part 
of the Punjab proper. But Haryana dnd Delhi in particular, 




General Report on the Admini~~~ion of the Punaab Territories, 
from 1854-55 to 1855-56 incfusive. Calcutta, I 56. p39. 
P.H.M. van den Dungen, Changes in Status and Occupation in 
Nineteenth Centry Punjab" in D.A. Low, Ed., Soundings in Modern 
South Asian History, London, 1968. p74. 
Ibid, p73. 
55 
The western region of the Punjab was the most backward in the 
province, as agriculture was poor, its communications rudimentary 
and it relied heavily on the navigation of the Indus River. 7 
Most of its cultivated area was id the hands of large landowners. 
In the Shahpur, Jhelum, Rawalpindi and Attock districts in 
the north, the Punjab's plains give way to the hills and stony 
moors of the Salt Range. Although rainfall in this region 
was adequate, irrigation facilities were poor. 8 The rugged 
and broken countryside made cultivation difficult. The hill 
people's meagre income gleaned from such infertile soil was 
supplemented by military service, first in the Mughal armies, 
later with the Sikh rulers and then with the British. 
Benefits of Irrigation 
Under the government of Ranjit Singh considerable progress 
had been made in extending cultivation by means of artificial 
irrigation. After annexation of the province the British under-
took the continuation of canal construction on a magnified 
scale. In pursuit of their policy of turning much of the 
uncultivated area of the Punjab into fertile land supporting 
viable crops, and thereby generating an appropriate land tax, 
the British offered loans and advances to cultivators to r~pair 








stated that many villages had accepted the government's offer 
10 to intensify cultivation by increasing the irrigation system. 
Political considerations were uppermost in the minds of the 
British administrators in this area of extended and improved 
cultivation. 
While the system of inundation canals was dependent upon self-
support from the· villages, the British Board of Administration 
and, after 1853, the Chief Commissioner, fully supported the 
vast undertaking of the Bari Doab Canal, to water the land 
between the Ravi and the Beas Rivers in which the Manjha was 
located. 11 The positive economic and political results that 
would be gained from the completion of this canal were evident. 
The benefits of the canal, traversing the heart of the Manjha, 
would, it was hoped, "attach the people to the British govern-
12 
ment." In post-annexation Punjab an inclination towards Sikhs, 
often at the expense of other groups, was a feature of British 
policy. The British had great respect for Sikhs [whom they 
regarded in general a13 Khalsa Sikhs} since the two Anglo-Sikh 
wars. However, while they admired Sikhs' martial prowess, 
they also were suspicious of them, and did not wish to encourage 
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were interested in creating favourable conditions so that the 
largest group, Sikh-Jats, would continue to utilise their skill 
at husbandry and their enterprise to become very successful 
agriculturists. 
With the same political end in mind, while the Bari Doab Canal 
was still under construction, the Hasli Canal, which also 
traversed the Manjha, was re-opened, providing the first 
stimulus to increased production and improved farming practices. 13 
Furthermore, the British paid teams of labourers to keep up 
inundation and perennial canals. Canal, and road construction 
employed large numbers of Punjabis, especially Mazhbi Sikhs, 
the so-called Untouchables, considered by many Sikhs as not 
belonging to the Sikh panth. 
Other regions of the province were mainly left to their own 
devices without assistance from the Provincial government, 
for the same political aims. Outer districts were neglected 
in favour of the central districts which were populated by 
Sikhs, in the main. 14 
Control of the Land 
In their efforts to create a viable agricultural economy in 
the Punjab, the British administrators were aware of the 
13 





importance of well-constructed roads and railways for the 
transportation of goods. One of the most significant of these 
was the Grand Trunk Road, of which the Cis-Siutlej section 
was metalled and bridged by 1857. 15 The Grand Trunk Road 
was of great military importance during the Mutiny. Without 
this road, especially in the rainy season, it would have 
proved impossible for troops, supplies and siege trains to 
have reached Delhi. 16 
In addition to improved irrigation, the development of 
transport facilities, and the application of modern farming 
methods, the British initiated a land policy that would favour 
the rural masses. In a predominantly rural province such as 
the Punjab, the British believed it was imperative to improve 
the living standards of the peasantry in order to win them 
over. 
Political power in such an overwhelmingly rural society as 
the Punjab depended on control of the land. The basic 
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Governor General to the Board of Administration17 on 31 March 
1849. 18 They included instructions on how to deal with the 
various loyal chiefs and jagirdars, they ordered to be forfeited 
the rent-free tenures of every rebel of the second Anglo-Sikh 
War, and they recommended that, in order to make use of the 
traditional local self-governing bodies such as the village 
communities, they were to be maintained in their integrity. 
This system of administration, influenced by the British 
District Officers who had their background in the North-Western 
Provinces, accorded well with the admonition to respect village 
. 19 coparcenaries. 
Based on the principles favoured by John Lawrence, the Mahalwari 
Settlement, as developed in the North-Western Provinces, was 
17 
The Punjab Board of Administration was initiated in 1849 
by Governor-General Dalhousie as an alternative to appointing 
Henry Lawrence as head of the Provincial government. 
Dalhousie and Henry Lawrence had opposing views regarding 
the treatment of the Indian aristocratic classes. The Board 
comprised three members, the brothers Lawrence, Henry and 
John, and Charles Mansel, and was a novelty in the 
administrative history of British India. The basic problem 
of treatment of the aristocratic classes divided the members 
of the Board irreconcilably, and it was abolished on 4 February 
1853. Henry Lawrence believed the aristocracy should have 
been supported, and their jagirs, where appropriate, continued 
in order·to cause the .least possible upheaval in the transition 
to British rule whereas John Lawrence favoured appeasemenk 
of the masses, as did Dalhousie. John Lawrence was appointed 
Chief Commissioner of the Punjab after the demise of the 
Board. Domin, pp30ff; Bosworth Smith, Vol. I, pp2343.ff. 
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Based on the principles favoured by John Lawrence, the Mahalwari 
Settlement, as developed in the North-Western Provinces, was 
introduced into the Punjab. Under this system a regular settle-
ment comprised two parts: 
1. To survey estates, or mahals, and classify soils according 
to their productiveness. 
2. To inquire into property relations and enter them in the 
records of rights. 
The Mahalwari Settlement was considered to be appropriate for 
those provinces where "for the most part village communities 
with landlord rights are dealt with; that is to say where the 
joint body of co-sharers is regarded as the landlord and is 
responsible for one assessed source of revenue. 1120 
These principles were set out in a publication first used in 
the North-Western Provinces, and issued in the Punjab in 1849, 
and later Oudh, in 1856, Thomason's Directory for Revenue 
Off . 21 icers. For the most part this enabled the village 
communities and actual cultivators to continue to enjoy the 
position of strength they had maintained under Sikh rule. 
20 
21 
B.H. Baden-Powell, A Short Account of the Land Revenue and 
its Administration in British India, Oxford. 1894. p171. · 
Directions fur Revenue Officers in the Punjab, Ed., D.G. Barkley, 
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Revenue officers were to deal directly with the village 
zamindars or with the proprietary coparcenars, thereby dispensing 
with the need for middlemen. In the Punjab the actual 
cultivators typically were also the proprietors. 
A characteristic of the village system was the joint liability 
which was enforced by the British, although under the Sikh 
government it had been somewhat relaxed. The British viewed 
the practice of joint responsibility as a safeguard for the 
punctual payment of the land revenue. This was emphasised in 
the Administration Report of 1854-56, "Primarily each man 
cultivates and pays for himself, but ultimately he is responsible 
for his coparcenars and they for him; and they are bound 
together by a joint liability. 1122 It was intended to serve 
as a buffer against encroachment from moneylenders, and to prevent 
the transfer of peasants' land into the hands of auction 
23 
buyers. 
Referring to the North-Western Province, S.B. Chaudhuri places 
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Banias belong to Hindu commercial castes, and were often money-
lenders. Mahajans, who also were purchasers of transferred 
lands, were village or town bankers. 
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the flames of rebellion. 25 In contemporary accounts moneylenders 
typically are referred to in derogatory terms, such as "usurious 
bania," or "sleek mahajan. 026 However, while resentment of the 
money-lenders certainly existed, there is little support for 
the theory that this was a prime incentive for popular rural 
hostility towards the British, who, as enforcers of land 
transfers through the court process, may have been seen as ,being 
in collusion with the banias and mahajans. More recent, detailed 
study shows that disturbances tended to occur in those areas 
where the grip of the money-lender was at its weakest. 27 This 
was the case in the Punjab as well as in the North-Western 
Provinces, where the populace rose against the banias, and 
destroyed their hated account books, as in the town of Kamalia, 
in the Multan Division. There had not been an unusual number 
of forced land sales for incurred debt to the moneylenders. 28 
Asra rule Sikh Jats stayed out of the hands of banias. Land 
transferred was usually for their own convenience, or for such 
social purposes as marriage ceremonies. Most of this alienated 
25 
S.B. Chaudhuri, Ci.vilian I€bellion in the M.ltinies, p21. 
26 
P.A.R. 1856-57 to 1857-58, p4. 
27 
Eric Stokes, pl65, pl75. 
28 
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Most of this alienated land remained within the wider community. 29 
On the eve of rebellion the business of the first regular settle-
ment had been completed in the central districts of the Punjab, 
where most Sikhs lived. The third Administration Report 
summarised the settlement proceedings so far, "the cultivators 
are essentially peasant proprietors. There are no farmers or 
middlement, and generally no great landlords. As a rule each 
man owns and fills his own glebe, upon which he pays the revenue 
and pockets all the profits. 1130 This peasant proprietor, almost 
typically a Sikh Jat, was a feature peculiar to the Punjab. 
The Sikh peasantry was in a singular position. While only 55 
per cent of Punjabis as a whole were earning their livelihood 
from agriculture, the proportion among Sikl13was 71 per cent, 
revealing the social background of the Sikhs. 31 More 
important, however was the high proportion of proprietors among 
the Sikhs who earned their living from the land. The 1868 Census 
Report of the Punjab comments on the great discrepancy between 
numbers of Sikh proprietors and Sikh tenants. Proprietors among 
Sikhs outnumber tenants 100:23, whereas proportions were much 
closer among Muslims at 100:61 and Hindus at 100:55 32 Of the 
29 
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Punjabi peasantry, 11.7 per cent were Sikh proprietors and 4.7 
per cent only Sikh tenants. 33 The Sikh proprietors were 
concentrated in the ten central districts of the Punjab, the 
Manjha. However, in the north-western parts of the province, 
not a single Sikh proprietor had been located. 34 
The British land policy continued the strong position which 
village communities and actual cultivators had maintained under 
Sikh rule. By investing landed proprietary rights with the 
members of the village communities, the British believed 
themselves to be continuing the policies that were popular with 
the Sikh panth in general, and Sikh Jats in particular, under 
Ranjit Singh's government. The privileged position which Sikh 
Jats, especially had enjoyed under Ranjit's rule, was maintained 
and strengthened by order of the British court system. 35 
The land revenue settlement was an important aspect of the 
British land policy. The history of colonial rule in India 
had proved frequently that a heavy land tax, rigidly enforced, 
was counter-productive. Over-assessment of a particular property 
would make ownership of that property an unprofitable under-











provinces, had proven to have been set at too high a rate> thus 
inhibiting improvement in the agrarian sector. The North-Western 
Provinces provided the British in the Punjab with a clear example 
of how excessive government revenue demands, required in cash 
rather than kind, contributed to the outcome of forced land 
sales and social disintegration. For instance, the disastrous 
results of over-assessment of land tax in Delhi Division caused 
37 peasant to flee into neighbouring Sikh states. 
A moderate land tax was imperative to create a progressive and 
prosperous province, profitable for the Directors of the company. 
So, the summary settlements were reduced further. That the 
British administrators so readily reduced the land revenue demand 
tends to corroborate the theory that they did so because of 
h 11 k . f S . kh J t f · 1 · · 3 S t ewe - nown capacity o i as or mi itant action. 
In fact, it suited British policy in the Punjab, for they were 
well aware that over-assessment was ultimately unprofitable. 
Also, relatively light revenue assessments were offered to 
encourage former Khalsa soldiers to resettle on the land. 
In the Punjab, disintegration of the village communities due 
to increased indebtedness and the subsequent forced sales of 
lands, could only develop, as it did in the North-Western 
Provinces, over a longer period of time, if indeed it would 
do so at all. Records of sales and transfers for arrears show 
that, although the number of landholdings alienated increased, 
37 
38 
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it was gradual and, by 1857, as yet a very small number. Further-
more, many of the forced sales did not pass out of the control 
of the caste group, but merely passed from an individual 
proprietor, or co-sharing body, to another within the caste. 
So, sales figures alone do not provide an accurate picture, 
nor do the exaggerated accounts of British officials who saw 
only what came before them in the courts. 39 Even in the rare 
occurrence of Sikh Jats losing their lands their dominant 
position in the local economic and political arena was not 
challenged. 
In the years 1851-53 the Administration Report recorded that 
there were eight cases of forced land sales or transfers. 40 
This had reached three forced land sales and 14 transfers by 
1856-57. 41 
Other reasons for land alienations, further muddy the waters 
of the somewhat simplistic theory of events some of the British, 
and some subsequent historians, had to offer. The land had 
to be of value to the auction purchasers. For instance, in 
the south east of the Punjab agriculture was uncertain because 
it was dependent upon the vagaries of the elements. Because 
of this reliance on unpredictable rainfall agricultural credit 
was limited, and so the land had less value than that in mo.re 
39 
T.R. Metcalf, pl35. 
40 
P.A.R. 1851-52 to 1852-53. pl37. 
41 
P.A.R. 1856-57 to 1857-58. ppl4-15. 
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42 secure areas. Therefore there were fewer forced land sales 
or transfers throughout much of the south west than in other 
parts of the province. 
In tracts that had access to more permanent forms of irrigation, 
agricultural practices were more advanced, and improvements to 
the land could be undertaken. Therefore, there was value in 
the land, and credit was available. Here increases in 
productivity depended upon the agriculturalists; if industrious 
they could do well and pay the revenue demand. Conversely, 
if agriculturists were held back by caste restrictions - for 
example, the custom of "Superior" Raj puts forbade them to plough 
the land themselves - or "laziness," or even lack of knowledge 
(which the British tended to assume was innate in some groups), 
or skill in farming practices, their land, if alienated for 
debt, were worth purchasing, for there existed the enhanced 
value of such land. 
In the south-west Punjab and parts of the lower frontier there 
were more land alienations, usually to the Hindu trading castes. 43 
This was the case, however,. before annexation, as well as after. 
In cases where civilian rebellion broke out in the Punjab, notably 
in Murri and Gugera, there had not been a greater rate of 
alienation of lands after annexation than there had been under 
Sikh rule. The inhabitants of these regions, predominantly 
42 




Muslims, were pastoralists more than agriculturists, because 
of the difficulty of farming the soil, and bec-ause of their 
inherited traits which, in Gugera at least, were more conducive 
to plundering other villages and rustling cattle than laboriously 
eking a living from the land. The Kharrals of Gugera were 
descended from Rajputs, and so looked with contempt upon those 
44 who ploughed the land. 
In parts of the upper frontier, where conditions were similar 
to those in the south west, where there were instances of 
individual landed property, land transfers were common before 
and after annexation. However, the money lenders usually were 
t h 1 . 45 no tea ienees. 
Also, there existed variations within a particular district, 
regarding the transfer of landed property rights. For example, 
in Jhelum, in the north only a small percentage of the cultivated 
land was transferred, mainly to agricultural castes, not to 
the urban money lenders. Yet in large parts of Guj~anwala, 
and in Ambala, of the larger number of alienated land, Hindu 
46 trading castes were the purchasers. In the ten central 
districts of the Punjab, which were most heavily populated by 
Sikhs, the small number of alienated land tended to remain in 
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holdings did not usually pass out of the hands of industrious 
proprietors into the ownership of urban absentee landlords. 
In the central districts of the Punjab, agriculture was secure 
due to the skill and enterprise of the proprietor/cultivators, 
predominantly Sikh Jats, aided by high rainfall and the added 
incentive of the proposed re-opening of the Bari Doab and Hasli 
canals, on which .work was progressing. Legal transfer of 
property rights acted first and foremost in favour of many landed 
Sikhs, although as a corollary, it began to diminish the power 
and influence of the hereditary landowners, the aristocratic 
classes of the Punjab. 
The Undermining of the Aristocracy 
To compensate for loss of revenue, because of the "light" land 
tax levy in the Punjab, the British administrators drastically 
reduced the amount of state funds that had been flowing into 
47 the coffers of the upper classes. This was carried out 
gradually, but steadily, substantially reducing the social status 
and power of the aristocracy. 
Chiefs and jagirdars48 had begun losing much of their power and 




Jagirdar: Collects revenues from the lands allotted to him. 
Unf?r the Sikh governments he was virtually a sovereign with 
the powers of life and death, whereas these powers were curtailed 
under British rule. The· jagirdar held no estate or property· 
itself. 
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by militant Sikhs, 49 while the emergent aristocracy had been 
brought under the control of Ranjit Singh. Under his auspices 
the limited nature of jagirs50 and their dependence on actual 
service were strictly adhered to. But, after Ranjit Singh's 
death, the lifestyle of the jagirdars became more precarious. 
Against this background, the British were able to reduce further 
the landed possessions of the upper classes without causing 
any major disturbances. However, grievances may have been 
harboured by those whose jagirs were substantially reduced or 
removed altogether. But, they maintained their livelihood and 
even, in some cases, their lands. 
A large portion of state revenue had been lost to the state's 
coffers during Sikh rule because of the excessive granting of 
jagirs. Altogether, nearly 40 per cent of the total revenues 
f th Pu . b 1 ' t d . ' S l o e nJa were a iena e as Jagirs. Vassal chiefs had 
formed an important section of the ruling class in Ranjit Singh's 
kingdom. They were among the foremost jagirdars of Ranjit and 
his successors, and their shares in the revenue of the Sikh 





These Sikhs predominantly were Sikh Jats. This movement 
promoted the egalitarian message of Sikhism. 
Jagir: mode of payment, granted for life or often in perpetuity 
to chiefs who served the state. J.S. Grewal, New Cambridge 
History of India, the Sikhs of the Punjab. Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. pl07. 
Grewal, pl09. 
Indu Banga, Agrarian System of the Sikhs, Late Eighteenth 
and Early Nineteenth Century. New Delhi. 1978. p62. 
71 
The aim of the British administrators was to diminish the position 
of the jagirdar by replacing gradually the jagir with a cash: 
payment, or pension, by depriving jagirdars of their former 
police power, and, ultimately, by phasing out jagirdars altogether 
b f . . f t. . . 53 y re raining rom gran ing new Jagirs. 
In the Manjha, dominated by Sikhs, concessions were made to 
strengthen the numbers of large landholders from other 
. t. 54 communi ies. This was mainly in order to check the dominant 
position held by Sikh proprietors, who were usually the 
cultivator as well. 
British land policy presented grater threats to the status and 
occupation of many landholding classes than did Sikh rule. 
Yet every change that occurred was influenced significantly 
by the desire of the landholders to maintain their traditional 
standing. In the central Punjab, Rajputs had lost much land 
to industrious cultivators, who had often been favoured by Sikh 
officials, 55 a situation continued by British officials. Sikh 
Jats frequently benefited from the Rajputs 1 lack of toil and 
industry on the land. The important position of the Rajputs 
in this central region had been seriously eroded during Sikh 
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Partly arising from the egalitarian peasant movement, led by 
Sikh Jats, was a peculiarity of Punjabi society, the predominance 
of peasant proprietors who cultivated the land themselves. 56 
While British land policy favoured the cultivating peasants, 
in particular Sikh Jats, at the expense of the aristocratic 
classes, the latter were not entirely divested of their holdings. 
They, in the main, retained their livelihood, their positions, 
and, in many cases, some landed possessions. 
So, tendencies often seen as a result of the advent of the 
British were, in fact, already in existence under Ranjit Singh. 
Furthermore, some Sikh aristocrats, in 1857, welcomed the 
opportunity to redress past animosities towards the British. 57 
56 
57 
B.H. Baden-Powell, Land Systems of British India, London, 
1892. 3 Vols. Reprint New York, London, 1972. Vol II, p569. 
More on this ~n Chapter 5. 
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5. MILITARY SITUATION BY 1857 
In 1856, out of the entire British garrison in India of 45,000 
men, 16,000 were quartered in the Punjab. 1 The strength of 
the Indian Army, that is the Bengal Army, had been reduced 
regularly until, in 1856, there was a total of 230,000, the 
great bulk of whom were concentrated in the Punjab. 2 Five weak 
European corps were all that remained to hold the region from 
the Sutlej River westwards to the frontier, as they were greatly 
outnumbered by Hindustanis? 3 
The Punjabis serving abroad in the regular army, during the 
year before the outbreak of mutiny, were sending their pay home 
to the Punjab, thereby enriching that province. Many of these 
soldiers also sent home to their villages their spoils of 
4 plunder. The Sikh Jat agriculturists, especially those of 
the Manjha, benefitted greatly from this influx of wealth. 
In the years before, thousands of rupees had been drained out 
of the Punjab, especially to Oudh, because the Hindustani sepoys 
serving in the Punjab had been sending their pay home. 
Because of the military qualities and skill of the Sikhs, the 
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Punjab. There were three areas of military service available 
to Sikhs and other Punjabis. They were the armies of the East 
India Company, which included the Military Police; the Punjab 
Irregular Frontier Force, known by the acronym "Piffers," which 
had been formed as a local body after annexation; and the 
civilian Police Force, which was utilised to strengthen the 
executive power and suppress internal disturbances. 5 
The Bengal Army recruited the most restless and militant people 
of the Punjab. They were enlisted in disciplined, British-
controlled units, so they would not be in a position to create 
disturbances in the province. The British policy of altering 
the composition of the Bengal Army by enlisting Punjabis and 
Sikhs was intended to provide an admixture of races and creeds 
so one race, caste or religion did not dominate. Previously, 
the regular army had been dominated by high-caste Hindus, mainly 
Brahmins, drawn from Oudh and Bihar. The Governor-General, 
Dalhousie's attitude to this policy was that conditions in the 
army, as well as in the Punjab, would improve upon enlistment 
of Sikhs. Initial restrictions, however, imposed by the govern-
ment, severely limited the number of Sikhs admissible to the 
regular army. 
By 1851, however, a new line of policy commenced whereby a quota 




allowed. 6 While some officers commanding Bengal regiments 
stationed in the Punjab enlisted former Khalsa soldiers, others 
did not. Nevertheless, not enough young Sikhs could be found, 
who had never fought against the British, to enter the British 
forces. Therefore, there were less than 3,000 Sikh regulars 
7 in the Bengal Army by 1857. However, exact figures were not 
accessible until April 1858. 
The first regular Sikh regiments formed were two organised in 
the Cis-Sutlej States, after the annexation of the Trans-Sutlej 
States, after the first Sikh War in 1846. They had been intended 
to indlude'th:emost militant of the populace, and consisted pre~ 
dominantly of Malwa Sikhs. They were intended for use outside 
the Punjab. 8 During the mutiny they were incorporated into 
the Bengal Army and stationed in the North-Western Provinces, 
where the Ludhiana Regiment mutinied in June~· 1857. The 
Ferozepur Regiment remained loyal to the British. These 
regiments had not participated in the second Anglo-Sikh War. 
Four more regiments were formed, with recruits from the annexed 
Sutlej States, for general service, and stationed within the 
British territory in the Punjab to subdue the local population 
and guard the border of the Sutlej. They were called Local 








Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims. Experience with these forces was 
important for the later British recruitment programme. 9 
The First Local Sikh Infantry Regiment, recruited by Major Hodson 
who later established the Punjab Irregular Force, was to consist 
of only Sikhs, but for the sake of diversity, and to prevent 
the domination of the armed forces by one group, other recruits 
were also admitted, with Sikhs maintaining a dominant position, 
nevertheless. In 1853 Sikhs still comprised more than half 
of the strength of this First Sikh Regiment, so some of them 
were transferred to the Punjab Irregular Force, as directed 
10 by John Lawrence. 
The Second Sikh Infantry Regiment was recruited mainly from 
hill-men of the Jullundur Doab, and was mostly stationed there. 11 
The third Local Sikh Regiment had a large contingent of Hindu-
stan~ sepoys in its lines. And the 4th Sikh Regiment was 
conspicuous in volunteering to fight the insurgents at Multan 
in 1849. The first and fourth Sikhs fought the Khalsa troops 
at Multan, and so earned great respect from the British. Because 
these Malwa Sikhs fought well and were trustworthy soldiers, 
Dalhousie gave the orders for Sikhs to be enlisted from the 
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to be excluded from the regular regiments. Dalhousie resented 
this attitude, for he believed Mazhbis to be valiant soldiers 
with a very good reputation. However, he capitulated to his 
Chief Commissioner, John Lawrence, and his District Officers, 
and Mazhbis remained excluded until 1857, when they proved them-
selves before Delhi. 12 
Enlistment of Sikhs from the Manjha into the regular Bengal 
Army regiments had great political value, so in early 1857 
Dalhousie issued instructions on how Sikhs were to be treated 
in the ranks. They were not to be bullied, by high caste Hindus, 
into abandoning their customs, and were permitted to keep their 
13 hair and beards uncut. They were not to be formed into a 
separate company, but interspersed throughout the regiments. 
However, the on-going hostile attitude of the high-caste sepoys, 
mainly Brahmins from OUdh, plus the reserved attitude of the 
officers, discouraged Sikhs from enlisting in the regular army 
at this time. Those Sikhs, and other Punjabis, who were admitted 
into the regulars found themselves ostracised by the OUdh and 
Bihar sepoys. Thus, by 1857, the number of Sikhs permitted 
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Domin, pll5. 
However, until 1858 no returns of the composition of the Bengal 
Army were available. Ibid, pll7. 
Of the almost 3,000 Sikhs in 74 regiments of the Bengal Army 
approximately half of these could no longer call themselves 
Sikhs, for they had been pressured by the Hindustani sepoys 
to renounce Sikhism for Hinduism. Some Sikh sepoys had been 
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forced to leave the army because of this pressure from fellow 
sepoys. Furthermore, Sikhs were poorly represented among the 
officers, which was no inducement to them to enter the regular 
armed forces. Because Sikhs, and other Punjabis, were spread 
so thin amongst the regiments, their influence was diluted 
15 anyway. 
In addition to the Bengal A~my, the second course open to Sikhs 
was the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force, comprising mainly 
Muslims and Sikhs. 16 From the outset, this force was loyal 
to the British. The position of the Sikhs serving in the regular 
Bengal regiments was quite distinct from those in the Punjab 
forces, which were irregular units with special terms of enlist-
ment and service, and therefore separate aims. 17 
The Punjab Frontier Force had been formed to maintain internal 
peace in the province, and to guard the western frontier. To 
support the "Piffers" the Guide Corps was raised for services 
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Domin, p131; Montgomery, p70. 
of local knowledge, they were courageous, well-trained and 
18 possessed great endurance. At the frontier posts above 
Peshawar, the Khelat-i-Ghilzais were formed to protect the 
frontier, and support the British. 19 
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As the number of Sikhs in the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force 
was to be restricted, because a Sikh contingent was regarded 
as highly dangerous, there was a large admixture of Hindustanis. 
By 1854, of the entire strength of the irregular force of 17,500, 
only ten percent were Sikhs and almost one half were Punjabi 
Muslims. 20 However, the proportion of Sikhs had grown by 1857, 
so that it was considerable, but not dominant. The strongest 
position was held by Punjabi Muslims. The Punjab irregulars, 
numbering about 23,000, could have tipped the balance if they 
had sided with the Hindustani rebels, but they remained loyal 
to the British thereby ensuring a British victory by swelling 
the troop numbers, replacing disarmed sepoy regiments, and by 
fighting alongside the British on the Ridge before Delhi. The 
Sikh levies raised by the independent Sikh chiefs also added 
to the loyal troops endeavouring to keep the province calm. 
Recruitment parties travelled throughout the province, including 
the Manjha, from June 1857. However, the term Sikh is misleading 
as the Punjabi troops consisted of other Punjabis as well; so 
18 






difficulties arise in endeavouring to ascertain the true 
proportion of Sikhs. It would appear that Sikhs enlisted in 
somewhat small numbers in the early months of rebellion, but 
their loyalty was rekindled when the British finally re-took 
Delhi in late September 1857. 21 
The third area of service in which Sikhs could enrol was the 
Military Police. The formidable police force had been raised 
to preserve public order. 22 Of the civilian police, the ordinary 
police force was better paid in the Punjab than in other 
provinces. The customary chaukidar was retained, and paid by 
villages and municipalities, whereas the detective police were 
. 23 
paid by the government. Sikhs were admitted to the detective 
police in quite large numbers. This service was generally 
preferred to that of the military police. Both played an 
important part in the mutiny. As a rule they did not support 
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6. SIKHS RESIST OUTRIGHT MUTINY 
This chapter deals with the crux of the problem of the response 
of Sikhs to the "Indian Mutiny" of 1857. The previous chapters 
have led us to this point, where we will endeavour to pull all 
the tangled threads together and ascertain why Sikhs resisted 
outright mutiny, if indeed they did. 
In contemporary British official accounts of events during 1857 
a number of reasons were offered for the support, be it active 
or passive, provided by Sikhs in the Punjab. These accounts 
are based on the importance of fair and good administration 
of the province by the British rulers since annexation in 1849. 
The self-congratulatory stance taken by the British officials 
and their apologists is little more than virtual propaganda. 1 
This attitude is echoed by the writings of nineteenth century 
b16graphers such as R. Bosworth Smith, and contemporary 
historians, such as J. Cave-Browne. 
Controversy continues to range amongst historians about the 
motives which compelled large numbers of Indians to rise against 
the British throughout northern India in 1857. Similarly, 
controversy surrounds an understanding of the reasons why the 
majority of Sikhs in the Punjab did not rebel against the British. 
According to the British, the crucial point that influenced 
1 
Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 18, 1859. p323. 
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the Sikhs during the mutiny was the general situation in the 
Punjab. Broad sections of the rural community had not yet been 
adversely affected in their living conditions. 2 Because of the 
great reduction in land tax, peasant lands had not been 
transferred to any extent, as w.as the situation in the older 
provinces. Furthermore, the social structure of the Punjab 
was still intact, although British policy was increasingly under-
mining the power and position of the aristocratic and land-
owning elements of society before 1857. Those factors that 
were to cause such upheaval in the North-Western Provinces and 
Oudh were largely lacking in the Punjab. 3 While on the surface 
this would appear to back up the British contention: that Sikhs 
in the Punjab did not rebel against them in 1857 as a direct 
result of British beneficent government; similarly, that in 
the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, the populations rose against 
the British because of the extreme hardship they faced as a 
result of British rural reforms. 
But, as Eric Stokes goes to some efort to point out, closer 
inspection of particular districts in the North-Western Provinces 
makes it quite clear that there was no direct correlation between 
those areas of fiercest rebellion with those that were hardest 
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obscure than a straight-forward link between the agrarian upheaval 
caused by the British ruler's new economic policies and rebellion, 
as pursued by such historians as S.B. Chaudhuri, who went so far 
as to view the economic changes in Allahabad as an "agrarian 
revolution." 5 More recently, Domin goes to great lengths in 
dealing with the positive aspects of British rule in the Punjab. 
She views the situation in the Punjab as best understood in 
the light of that province 1 s socio-economic background. She 
notes substantial improvements in the living standards of both 
peasant proprietors and tenants, which had bean made possible 
at the expense of the former jagirdars and zamindars. 6 While 
condemning the capitalist motivations of the British, she admires 
the pro-peasant tone of their reforms regarding land ownership. 
She concludes that the continuation of privileges for Sikh Jat 
cultivators, begun under Ranjit Singh 1 s rule, resulted in their 
support in 1857. Because Domin adheres to a Marxist economistic 
approach, her conclusions are not complete. I do not believe 
she is actually incorrect in her belief in the significance 
of land issues and support of the peasantry as reasons for 
the absence of organised Sikh rebellion. But I do not believe 
these are the prime motivations. I think she has not gone far 
enough. Further detailed study of the central districts of 
5 
S.B. Chaudhuri, Civilian Rebellion in the Mutinies, p 298-99 .. 
6 
Domin, p 53 
84 
the Punjab emphasises the wait and see attitude of the majority 
of Sikhs, with its inevitable conclusion that, had Delhi not 
been retaken by the British, most Sikhs, and other Punjabis, 
would probably have risen against the much-weakened colonial 
7 power. With the help of such historians as Eric Stokes and 
Thomas Metcalf, we need to attempt a more complete picture of 
the Sikh response to 1857. 
If the factors present in the North-Western Provinces led to 
incidences of rebellion in that province, it follows that in 
the Punjab, where such economic hardships were as yet absent 
in the main, this lack of adverse circumstances could be seen 
as the reason for lack of organised rebellion on the scale of 
the older provinces. But this is faulty reasoning because it 
tends to base its premise on hindsight: because the majority 
of Sikhs did not revolt, therefore they had no intention of 
revolting. This is a recessing argument, and therefore not 
valid. Also, it is not borne out by the facts. At the very 
least, some doubt is raised regarding motives for rebellion 
against or support of the British. They continued the privileges 
meted out to Sikhs Jats, begun during Ranjit Singh's rule. 
Less efficient landholding castes, such as Rajputs and Sayyids, 
had not received these privileges from the Sikh government .• 
Sikh Jats had often been so entitled as to pay only the state 
revenue, with no extra payments because they belonged, in general 
7 
This is actually recognised in the official mutiny reports. 
P.M.R. Vol II, Report from R. Temple to G.F. Edmonstone, 
Secretary to the Government of India, 25 May 1958. p364. 
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to the favoured group of occupancy tenants. These Sikh Jats 
liv~d almost exclusively in the ten central districts of the 
Punjab, which were regularly settled up to 1856. 
The British administrators believed their economic and fiscal 
policies would in turn be rewarded by the loyalty of Punjabis, 
particularly the privileged Sikh massses. 
John Lawrence emphasised this in his Mutiny Administration Report, 
in those critical months. He stated, 
So long as we were at all able to exert authority, 
most agriculturists were quite willing to pay 
tribute to Caesar, but it would be vain to assume 
the existence of any active heartfelt loyalty. 
However, there existed no feeling against us; there 
was a kind of passive sentiment in our favour among 
the masses. 8 
Accordingly John Lawrence believed the people of the Punjab 
bore the British no ill-will, either before the outbreak of 
mutiny, or during it. 
Some British propaganda even went so far as to suggest that 
all Punjabis supported the British and that the Punjab was 
sompletely tranquil throughout the rebellion. It was stated 
categorically in the Punjab Administration Report of 1856-58 
that there was no grievance to complain of regarding the British 
land revenue system in that province. 9 It went on to state that 
8 
9 
P.A.R. 1856-57 to 1857-58, p39. 
This was reiterated in the Parliamentary Papers, Vol 18, 1859. 
p323. 
The tenures were fairly adjusted, and that there 
was no class, among landholders and cultivators who 
had suffered by British rule, there were no 
dispossessed malcontents, no depressed village 
communities, no upstart usurpers over the heritage 
of others through the operation of British laws, no 
wholesale extensive transfers of estates or tracts, 
from one set to another, although some unfortunate 
transfers of individual property did occur, but such 
cases were exception. So, among agriculturists, no 10 
benefit was to be gained by a change of government. 
In addition to their economic reforms, the British brought 
political stability to the Punjab which had been in a state 
f 1 . . . . h' d . 11 o upheava since RanJit Sing s emise. The British 
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administrators believed these efforts would be rewarded by the 
loyalty of the populace. When the Sikhs, on the whole, had 
not turned against them in 1857, they wholeheartedly believed 
this was due to their beneficial policies. 
However, conditions in the Punjab were not as favourable for 
the peasantry as the British asserted. The statistics, which 
show only a few forced sales or transfers by 1857, 12 do not 
reveal the complete picture. Many Sikhs were forced to leave 
their land because of economic hardship and seek paid employment 
10 
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elsewhere. According to the Administration Report of 1851-53 
this was due, primarily, to a slump in agricultural prices and 
h . d . 1 . 13 t e accompanying rop in rea income. High wages were offered 
in the large military cantonments and in the Department of Public 
Works because of the great demand for labour. This influenced 
the Sikh cultivator to abandon his field temporarily, to return 
at a more fortuitous time. 14 The Sikh peasantry in Amritsar 
District did not face such circumstances of hardship, but those 
in Lahore District did, where conditions were tough on the rural 
population in the early 1850s. 15 
Furthermore, conditions cannot have been perfect, even for those 
who were faring better on the land, for Sikhs lived with the 
defeat of two wars waged for their independence. Ex-Khalsa 
soldiers found it very dif:fi.icu1t ·:t.7D settle on the land, even 
though reasonable terms were granted them in order to do so 
successfully. However, they were not able to do what they were 
trained to do, that is soldiering. Former Khalsa soldiers were 
not permitted in the regular armed forces until the mid 1850s. 
So it is probable that these Sikhs, also, were not content. 
Even had conditions in the Punjab been as favourable as purported, 
Stokes discovered that this was not a motivating factor when 
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In the North-Western Provinces the high rate of forced land 
sales was not necessarily as a direct result of heavy land 
assessments. Often it was those districts whose assessment 
was lightest that had the highest transfer or sale rate. For 
instance, the "lightly" assessed parganas of Saharanpur and 
Sultanpur had a much higher rate of transfers than the more 
16 heavily assessed parganas of Gangoh and Deoband. More of 
an indication to being a successful agriculturist under the 
agrarian restructuring was the skill and industry of the 
cultivator. In the Punjab, Sikh Jat cultivators were the highest 
skilled and most enterprising of agriculturists. This situation 
was improved still further by the provincial government's 
continuation of privileges, regarding land tenure, and state 
revenue payments. Many individuals, the majority of whom were 
Sikhs, who had been tenants, were recorded by the British 
administrators as proprietors in the First Regular Settlement, 
. d t ' th . · 17 in or er o improve eir circumstances. 
The availability of adequate irrigation was also an important 
factor. The construction of irrigation canals was a significant 
step, because, under the new rural economy, in all the British-
controlled provinces where such construction works were under-
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proportion of Sikhs on the land, Sikh Jats, were enterprising 
cultivators who quickly took advantage of the benefits of canal 
irrigation. The backward, thirsty tracts in the North-Western 
Provinces were home to the main elements of revolt. 19 Similarly, 
in the Punjab those areas without the benefits of reliable 
irrigation were the scenes of anti-British sentiment, for 
instance the dry and barren districts in the south-west, and 
the southern-most district of the Central Plains, Ferozepur. 
The districts of Sirsa, Hissar and Rohtak, in Haryana, which 
were arid and without benefit of year-round irrigation before 
1857, were openly hostile to the British. 20 The inhabitants of 
Haryana had more in common with their eastern neighbours than 
with Punjabis, and sympathised with the rebel cause, justifying 
their unrest as being a direct result of British rural reforms. 21 
The dominant cultivating castes in Haryana were Jats, Rajputs 
and Gujurs, all of whom were disaffected. 22 The dominant castes 
and notables initiated rebellion in their regions, predominantly 
for personal and local reasons than a real desire to rid 
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populations in the backward, barren lands in the Derajat, for 
instance, and in many parts of Multan, remained tranquil through-
out the crisis of 1857. 
Just as the response to the rebellion in 1857 cut across the 
major caste categories, so was Sikh response varied. Within 
the major castes was a divergence of response, because such 
response followed vertical political lines rather than the 
horizontal divisions of caste affiliations. 24 So the question 
becomes one not of Muslim versus Hindu, or Hindu versus British, 
but one of Hindu versus Hindu, and so on. For instance, the 
Hindu Jats of Rohtak versus other Hindu Jats of Rohtak. 25 
So the response of Sikhs in the Punjab is not an easy one to 
gauge either, because of the variety of types of Sikhs, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, Sikhs and Sikhism. Sikhs are referred 
to in official reports, and by most historians, as a distinct, 
unified group. However, as McLeod so ably points out, this 
is not so, and because of this it is difficult to understand 
just which Sikhs did what. Sikh Jats were the most dominant 
group in the Manjha. Mazhbi Sikhs, the outcasts, not considered 
by many Sikhs to be entitled to call themselves Sikhs at all, 
played a significant role in 1857 in their support of the British, 
especially in the fight for Delhi. Ex-Khalsa Sikhs formed yet 






distinction between these sections of Sikhs, as amongst some 
sections there was an overlapse. Another group of Sikhs were 
those who did not fight against the British in _the Anglo-Sikh 
Wars, who remained loyal to them during 1857 also. Outside 
the central districts the influence of Sikhs was lessened in 
proportion to their numbers. However, to further complicate 
matters, some Sikhs did rise up against the British, within 
Pu . h bl l b . th . . s· lk 26 the nJab, t e nota e examp e eing e uprising at ia ot, 
and outside the Punjab. 27 
It would appear, therefore, that exorbitant land revenue demands 
were not the prime motivation for rebellion in the North-Western 
Provinces, and,so, the "lenient"land settlements in the Punjab 
were not the reason for binding the Sikh populace, in general, 
to the British. 
With such a comparatively small number of forced land sales 
and transfers in the Punjab, merely three forced sales and 14 
transfers by 185 7, 28 it is evident :±hat alienation of landed 
property rights was not an overwhelming issue for Punjabis, 
even less so for cultivating Sikhs who, as a rule, managed to 
hold onto their lands and pay the revenue demand on time. This 
26 
27 
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high-lights the ease with which one may view it as the primary 
reason for their lack of revolt. 
Other reasons for a high transfer rate, as well as a lack of 
skill and industry, were poorly-organised, less-structured 
village communities, and co-sharing bodies who were not homo-
geneous. These village communities may well have remained 
passive while los·ing greater amounts of land than other well-
organised groups, while better-organised, structured village 
communities, under less pressure of circumstances, could build a 
shared grievance into an impetus to revolt. 29 Such patterns of 
community organisation led to different responses, even within 
castes and districts. The highly-organised, farming Jat 
communities of the western parganas of Muzaffarnagar broke into 
open rebellion against the British. They had lost some land to 
the money lender in the years before 1857, but their losses were 
small when compared with those of the Sayyid communities of the 
eastern parts of the district. 30 The Sayyids suffered a greater 
loss of land, yet remained passive in 1857. 
Those areas where rebellion was rife were not necessarily those 
in the worst circumstances, nor had they had most lands 
transferred. British land policy was but one grievance held by 






complex mixture of motives that led some to rebel and others to 
remain loyal to the British. It did not follow that those who 
lost most were most inclined to rebel. 31 More important than the 
material loss of lands, or dire hardship due to overassessment, 
was the loss of lordship rights, and prestige in the wider 
political community. Those zamindars who had been dispossessed 
of their landed property rights still maintained an important 
position within the village community. But, on the larger 
political stage their position and status was greatly undermined 
as a result. 32 They were reduced "to a level with the meanest 
33 before the law," and as such counted as unimportant with the 
British administration. 
Stokes poses a theory of "relative rather than absolute 
d . . ,,34 epr1.vat1.on. So, the perceived loss of their powers of 
military lordship and jurisdiction, and their traditional status 
and way of life, was of utmost importance to those zamindars, 
magnates and taluqdars in the older provinces who rebelled 
against the British. These traditional leaders were politically 
rather than economically motivated. The aim of many of the 











To a great extent, the forces which lay behind Central India's 
magnate's decision to resist the British were absent in the 
Punjab. Furthermore, rebellion could only be attempted when 
there was a groundswell pressure from below, that is from the 
rural masses. This was not forthcoming in the Punjab, as they 
had not been pushed by such adverse circumstances that they would 
take the chance against the power and prestige of the British. 
For, while the British put in place policies that bettered the 
lot of the peasantry, they simultaneously weakened the position 
of the traditional elites, the very people to whom the rural 
masses looked for leadership. 
Rural revolt was essentially elitist in character. In fact, in 
the countryside the mass of the population appears to have had 
little to do with resistance. At most they followed their caste 
superiors and their traditional leaders. 35 The superior 
castes and communities who took the lead in the rebellion in the 
North-Western Provinces were a minority of the population and, of 
these, even fewer were landowners. 36 The power and influence of 
the traditional elites usually were enough to carry the superior 
peasant castes with them in revolt against the British, or in 








Traditional leaders, who had been stripped of their power and 
influence, led the peasant masses in Haryana against the British: 
such leaders as Rao Tularam in Gurgaon, who collected a small 
force of cavalry and civilians to fight against the British, 38 
and many feudatory chiefs who had been maintained in power and 
affluence by the British since 1800, such as the Nawab of Jhujjur, 
39 the Raja of Bulubgurh and the Nawab of Faruknagar. 
But in the Punjab proper traditional Sikh leaders had been killed, 
imprisoned or exiled, leaving peasants bereft of any competent 
leadership for organised resistance. Those leaders who remained 
were too minor, and therefore ineffectual, to have any real 
influence over the masses. 
The disbandment of the Khalsa army had significant effects on the 
Sikh community as a whole. As the majority of Khalsa soldiers 
had fought against the British they were deprived of all claims 
for pensions and privileges. 40 But the British did not want to 
encourage the reformation of the formidable Khalsa army. So, 
they were re-settled on the land, whence tolerable terms and 
inducements were offered them. Many of the former soldiers were 
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they were denied employment as soldiers with the British, 41 
42 
and refused retirement pensions for the future. Loyal Khalsa 
soldiers, that is those who did not take up arms against the 
British in the second Anglo-Sikh War, were rewarded with 
positions, and in some cases jagirs. 
In order to prevent any future hostilities by former Khalsa 
soldiers, the British jailed and/or exiled their leaders, and 
abolished the jagirs of those aristocratic elements who had 
fought against them. In some cases even the lands and all 
possessions were confiscated from Sikh sardars, or chiefs. 
However, by 1853, the Governor-General deemed it time to release 
those Sikh sardars who had been imprisoned, and by early 1854 
they were released and their pensions increased, although still a 
43 tiny fraction of their former allowances. 
By 1857, all the Sikh sardars who had played a prominent role in 
the 1848-49 Anglo-Sikh War were dead or exiled. Sardar Chattar 
Singh had died at the end of 1855; Bhai Maharaj Singh, the 
staunchest Sikh leader, died in exile in Singapore in mid 1856. 44 
The leader of the Multan insurrection, Dewan Mulraj, died in 1851. 





This was the situation immediately after the second Anglo-Sikh 
War, but it changed by 1851 when Sikhs were recruited for 
service in the Punjab Forces, and later even in the Bengal Army, 





alive, but he was rendered bereft of all means to challenge the 
British. Still in exile in Benares during 1857, he died there in 
April 1858. 45 Maharani Jind Kaur alone was in a position to 
mount any opposition to the British. She made valiant efforts to 
do so from her exile in Nepal, but Sikhs failed to rally to her 
46 cause. So, there were no organised Sikh civilian uprisings in 
the Punjab because of the lack of effective leadership, and the 
absence of the active support of the Sikh masses, the majority of 
whom were fence-sitting. They possibly could have been aroused 
by a brilliant Sikh leader, but a Sikh chief of that calibre was 
not available. Any other chiefs of a minor standing who had 
fought the British had lost much of their former economic and 
l ·t· 1 47 poi ica power. Those chiefs who had sided with the British 
in 1848-49 were not pressured by those forces that motivated 
their counterparts in the Gangetic Plain to oppose the British 
rulers. Even if so inclined, they were neither powerful enough, 
nor wielded the influence necessary to threaten the British in 
the Punjab. Furthermore, an awareness of how the British 
authorities dealt with rebels discouraged them from rising 
against the British. 
A considerable number of jagirdars and other holders of feudal 









or had even actively supported the British forces. After 
annexation the jagirdars had gradually been deprived of their 
former privileged position in society, by a dismantling of their 
incomes. By 1853 the zarnindars had begun to best the jagirdars, 
even re-taking the land which the Sikhs had cultivated themselves 
48 for many years. Thus, the role of the Sikh aristocracy, 
according to Domin, during 1857 was relatively minor in that, 
in view of their diminished situation, they were not in a 
position to have rendered substantial assistance to either 
propagarist. 49 T.E.J. Singh was the only Sikh leader, apart 
from the independent Sikh chiefs, who had the influence to raise 
large bodies of troops in any force in support of the British, 
or against them. 50 
Many Sikh sardars supported the British in 1857, for their own 
political survival, especially _those who had fought against 
the British in 1848. 51 To a large degree, they had been stripped 
of their military power and much of their political influence. 
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property confiscated.52 A very important factor for aristocratic 
elements, whose privilege had been increasingly undermined by 
the British authorities since annexation, was their honour, 
or izzat. This was more important even than regaining their 
confiscated jagirs and lands. Having had their jagirs and 
pensions, and even their land and all possessions in some cases, 
forfeited, or at least drastically reduced, many Sikh aristocrats 
welcomed the opportunity to retrieve their izzat, which support 
of the British offered in 1857. A natural sequel of re-
establishing their izzat was a redemption of their jagirs and 
lands. 
Among the most loyal supporters of the British in the Punjab in 
1857 were the independent Sikh chiefs. They had an independent 
internal jurisdiction, but were politically dependent on the 
53 British-controlled government. Of the twelve princely states 
in the Punjab, six had Sikh rulers. These were Patiala, Nabha, 
Jhind, Faridkot, Kapurthala and Kalsia, the largest of these 
being Patiala. 54 
The independent Sikh states were not subject to the agrarian 
reforms that occurred in the Punjab. The rajas did not lose 
land, nor did they relinquish any political power and autonomy • 
. 
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of the British were not pressured by the diminishment of their 
political roles, and thus did not rebel against the British. 
They had supported, and in turn were supported by, the British 
since 1809. Also, they were protected by, and dependent upon, 
the British. Because of this background of mutual support Domin 
undervalues the importance of the independent Sikh chiefs. 
Because of their earlier support of the British, she believes 
this presupposes their continuing support. 55 However, this can 
not be assumed, for, if they had been stripped of their powers 
of military lordship and jurisdiction, I believe they could 
not have been relied upon by the British, no matter what past 
loyalties and collaborations may have been. In this, Domin 
ignores the real role played by the Sikh princes. Their role 
was double-edged. They wielded considerable influence and power, 
and had many well-trained troops under their command. Had they 
opposed the British they would have carried with them a very 
large number of peasants, because, as Stokes maintains, the 
peasantry follow their traditional leaders for or against the 
overlord. In Oudh and in the North-Western Provinces some 
princes raised armies to ride against the British. Therefore, 
the active support of the Sikh chiefs was of utmost importance 




The princes were also numerous in the Trans-Sutlej Division, 
where the majority of them were Sikhs. The Sikh chiefs whole-
heartedly supported the British by raising levies of troops 
and horse, by helping to suppress unrest and pursue mutineers 
and by fighting alongside the British before Delhi. The Cis-
Sutlej chiefs, of Patiala, Nabha and Jhind, guarded the 
communications at the rear of the force before Delhi. 56 The 
Raja of Nabha raised troops, horse and foot, the protect the 
siege train from Phillour to Ambala. These chiefs and their 
troops also protected the British military stations and patrolled 
the Grand Trunk Road from Ferozepur and Phillour down to the 
walls of Delhi throughout the campaign. 
Throughout the rebellion, the greater proportion of the 
inhabitants of the Cis-Sutlej Division displayed sympathy with 
h . 57 t e mutineers. This was an important division in that the 
Grand Trunk Road traversed its entire length, about 200 miles 
which had to be kept open to allow men and supplies to reach 
Delhi from the Punjab. A very small population of Sikhs lived 
in this division, but it had as its neighbours the Sikh princedoms 
ot Patiala, Nabha and Jhind. The British responded swiftly 
to the unsettled population in this region by disarming the 
56 
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populace, by punishing perpetrators of dissension, and by 
utilising the independent Sikh chiefs and their troops to quell 
any unrest. The four million inhabitants of this region were 
of mixed races, and were more closely allied to Hindustanis· 
than to Punjabis. 
In the Cis-Sutlej Division the British had a great deal of 
assistance from the chiefs of the protected Sikh states. The 
effect these, and other influential chiefs, had on the morale 
of the people was of greater value even than the troops they 
supplied. The Raja of Jhind and 400 of his troops helped protect 
Karnal, where Ahmud Ali Khan, the Nawab of Karnal, held a 
critical position, just 70 miles north of Delhi. 58 
Within days of the outbreak of mutiny the Maharaja of Patiala 
put himself and a large contingent of soldiers, both horse and 
foot, at the disposal of the British. He sent 1,100 men and 
munitions to maintain tranquillity in Thanesar, and 150 to Karnal. 
Detachments of Patiala Horse were posted along the Grand Trunk 
59 Road in an organised system of patrols. The district of Ambala 
was also guarded by the Maharaja of Patiala. The Raja of Chamba 
protected the European women and children at the Dalhousie 
58 
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Sanitorium, and then captured 30 of the Sialkot mutineers. 60 
The Raja of Kapurthala marched at the head of a detachment of 
his troops to protect Hoshiarpur, when the Sialkot mutineers 
were abroad. Cis-Sutlej chiefs' troops garrisoned several posts 
of Karnal, Panipat, Kussowlie and Rhae, thereby enabling the 
British to maintain efficient communications. 61 
The Sikh chiefs of the Ludhiana district, the Raja of Nabha 
and the Kotila Nawab, lent their aid to the British. 62 This 
was of paramount importance to the British authorities in this 
district because the inhabitants of the city and environs were 
hostile to the British. The Gujur population around Ludhiana 
was hostile, but the Sikh population of this district sided 
. 
with the British. 
The aristocratic chiefs went to great lengths to support the 
British. As well as their active support in the form of troops, 
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loan opened throughout the Punjab to affray the heavy expenses 
of war. The loan operated very well on public opinion, as rural 
dwellers were delighted to see the wealthy classes forced to 
lend funds. 64 
Another factor that greatly helped the British in the Punjab 
in 1857 was the "fluke" that the frontier did not revolt. 
Peopled by "unruly" Muslim races, predominantly Pathans and 
Biloches, the North-West Frontier Province was a source of 
concern for the British authorities before the outbreak of 
hostilities in 1857. 65 
For the first time in Anglo-Indian history, the Amir of Kabul, 
Dost Mohammad, the ruler of Afghanistan, was friendly towards 
the British. So long as the subsidy continued to be paid to 
Dost Mohammad, and the Punjab remained true to the allegiance, 
the Afghans would remain "benevolently neutral." 66 The 
Akhund of Swat also supported the British government as much 
h ld d ' th ' ' 6 7 H t b k th ' as e cou uring e uprising. e sen ac ose mutineers 









harshly by the British authorities. The British realised it 
was only while it was in their interests that they would not 
oppose the British. 
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Immediately after the outbreak of mutiny the British instigated 
measures to tighten their hold on the Punjab. A state of 
emergency was enacted which placed all power in the hands of 
the Chief Commissioner, John Lawrence, who promulgated a Mutiny 
Act as early as 14 May 185 7. 68 Enormous.: powers were entrusted 
to military and civil officers. The British military authorities 
responded to the outbreak of rebellion by putting in place 
vigorous measures to maintain tranquillity in the province. 
These included a prompt disarming policy, harsh sentences for 
mutineer~, a widespread recruitment policy aimed at those restless 
elements of the community, heavy fines for unsupportive towns 
and villages, and the swift, merciless action taken by the 
authorities to maintain law and order and display an appearance 
69 of strength. The British response to the mutiny, especially 
the violent examples of the rebels, was more effective in 
preventing rebellion than their previous good government of 
the province. 
Of primary importance to the British was the disarming policy. 
This effectively prevented those who contemplated rising against 
68 
69 
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the British from doing so with any hope of success. The general 
disarming policy that was ·put in place after the defeat of the 
Khalsa in 1848 70 was effective, as, combined with the lack of 
potential rebel leaders of note, any hopes of the Khalsa re-
emerging had little chance of being successful without the 
benefit of arms. This general civilian disarming was extended 
to include the populations of the Cis-Sutlej and the Trans-
Sutlej Divisions, and civilians in the town bazaars, after the 
outbreak of mutiny in May 1857. On 1 July the process of 
disarming the population of ThanesarDistrict was begun. This 
district was very close to the focus of revolt, on the opposite 
banks of the Jumna River. The population displayed an open 
hostility to the British, as did a good portion of the 
inhabitants of Ambala and Karnal, all of whom were more affected 
by the proximity and intensity of rebellion than were the 
populations further to the west. The early disarming of sepoy 
regiments prevented any co-ordinated actions among those dis-
affected regiments. On 21 May four out of the five Bengal Army 
regiments still in the Peshawar cantonment were disarmed, against 
the protestations of their European officers, who believed they 
were trustworthy.71 
The many successful disarmings at the military stations 
70 
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throughout the Punjab spelt out the death knoll for concerted 
actions on the part of those sepoys who planned to mutiny, for 
without arms they were no match for well-armed British-controlled 
forces. Furthermore, this meant there was no armed back-up 
for those civilians who rebelled. Amongst the earliest measures 
taken was the disarming of the native brigade at Mian Mir. 
in the Lahore District on 13 May by Brigadier Corbett, without 
which the preservation of order in the Punjab would have been 
72 a difficult struggle. The disarming of two of the Native 
Infantry regiments at Multan was carried out as soon as the 
officers felt they could overawe them. On 9 June, before the-, 
news of the Julltlndur mutiny arrived, the regiments were success-
fully disarmed. The disarming at Multan was believed by the 
British authorities to be a turning point in the crisis in the 
Punjab, second only in importance to the disarming at Lahore 
. 73 
and Peshawar. Towards the end of June the Judicial Commissioner 
of the Punjab, Robert Montgomery, instructed his District 
Officers to have the complete disarming of Hindustanis carried 
74 
out. The 33rd and 35th Native Infantry regiments were q~iet±y 
and quickly disarmed at Jullundur Doab, as well as a wing of 
the 9th Light Cavalry, by Brigadier General Nicholson. After 
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Am 't 75 ri sar. The general disarming of the civilian population 
was so important to the British for it not only deprived restless 
populations of the means to rebel, it also had a marked effect 
on those who had not yet decided which side to support. 
As well as the widespread, successful disarming policy, the 
pursuit of mutineers and deserters also had its desired result. 
Proclamations of rewards for the apprehension of these rebels 
were posted in the Divisions, and the majority of the population 
was eager to comply. Escape for a mutineer, or a deserter, 
was very difficult, for most villages were anti-pathetic towards 
him. The Sikh population of Ludhiana posed a threat to mutinous 
t t . h D lh' t . . h . th 76 sepoys a temping to reac e i o Joint e insurgents ere, 
and the majority of the Sikhs in the Manjha sided with the 
British, for they harboured no love or respect for Hindustani 
sepoys. Moreover, Hindustani officials were unpopular with 
Punjabis, including Sikhs. Nearly every office of value to 
the British administration was held by the Hindustanis. After 
the outbreak of mutiny the Provincial Government displayed a 
universal antipathy towards them. Hindustanis were weeded out 
of all departments, therefore, and deported to their homes in 
75 
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77 the east. In their official reports after the mutiny the 
British over-emphasised this and other aspects of their so-
called divide and rule policy. 78 
Another significant aspect of the British response to the out-
break of rebellion was their province-wide recruitment policy, 
intended to encourage Punjabis on the whole, and Sikhs in 
particular, to the British cause. Recruitment throughout the 
Punjab gave a tangible means of rewarding the loyal and persuading 
them to suppress those Punjabis with anti-British sentiment. 
The recruitment programme was an important strategy on the part 
of the British which helped to swing the Punjab as a whole away 
from rebellion. Inter-clan rivalries were channelled, and the 
growing uncertainties, and.fears of a large section of the 
population were steered into competition and adventure, more 
productive and acceptable from the British perspective. 
Uncontrolled recruiting began during the state of emergency 
while the struggle for Delhi was in progress, and it continued 
after the fall of Delhi. 79 Although several historiansemphasise 
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outset, 80 official statements do not support this. In the 
Administration Report of 1856-58 it is stated that Sikhs from 
the Manjha showed an unwillingness to enlist in the company's 
armies. 81 Good recruits of this class,it.~continues, were not 
obtained until after the fall of Delhi. Sikhs, especially those 
who inhabited the Manjha, could await the outcome of the battle 
for Delhi, because they were not pressured by adverse living 
conditions, as were the inhabitants of the North-Western 
Provinces, nor were they unaware of the fighting strength at 
the command of the British. They could afford to refrain from 
joining either side until the fall of Delhi. 82 So, the Sikh 
masses, the veteran Khalsa soldiers and the younger Sikhs were 
in a position where they could bide their time until the decisive 
battle of Delhi desired to crush the rebellion at any cost. 
Sikhs, particuiarly those of the Manjha, were hesitant to side 
prematurely with either protaganist. The power and prestige of 
the British were diminishing in the long, hot summer on the 
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to decide who to back from the beginning. 
However, to further confuse the situation, and keep the debate 
alive, Robert Montgomery, in his summation of the district 
reports states that the "stalwart Sikhs who form the population 
of the Manjha were wholly on the British side throughout. Many 
villages were almost decimated by the number of recruits who 
flocked to form new regiments. •183 In the valleys and hills of 
Jhelum Division, where a large number of martial Muslim races 
dwelt, many were recruited to the British cause. By this measure 
the hill peoples were able to carry out their favourite military 
pastimes without posing a danger to the British. 84 
Immediately news of the outbreak of mutiny at Meerut had reached 
Lahore, on 13 May 1857, the Sikh Durbar at Lahore was assured 
of the government's support. Recruitment of Sikh levies was 
undertaken at once. Proclamations were posted calling for men 
to enlist as sowars and foot soldiers. Sikh Sirdars and many 
jagirdars of the district sent recruits. 85 Irregular Sikh 
regiments were raised, and more Sikhs were enlisted into the 
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regiments of the Bengal Army could not be relied upon to remain 
loyal, the raising of fresh regiments was a priority. These 
were irregular units in the main. 86 Throughout June 1857 
recruiting parties arrived in the Taran Taran pargana of Amritsar 
District, "being the nursery of the Sikh Khalsa soldiery." 8 7 
John Lawrence initially was hesitant in enlisting Sikhs into 
the military forces, but was soon swayed, by the Judicial 
Commissioner, Robert Montgomery, in particular, into realising 
f . f d . d b h d' d 88 the bene its o oing so over an a ave t e isa vantages. 
Major William Hodson, of the renowned Hodson's Horse, a regiment 
of Irregular Cavalry, wanted Sikh recruits, especially, for 
his regiment. Raised at Lahore, Sikhs formed the nucleus of 
89 Hodson's Horse. 
The recruitment drives in the Punjab were essential to that 
province's relative tranquillity. Therefore the most capable 
and martial of Punjabis, especially Sikhs. and Pathan tribesmen, 
86 
Irregular regiments differed from their regular counterparts 
in their terms for enlistment, their more informal military 
routine, and in the numbers of European officers who commanded 
them. Each unit generally had only three British officers 
compared with 23 in regular Bengal infantry battalions. 
Montgomery, p70. They were local units with special terms of 
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were enlisted into service of the British, particularly into 
"Piffer" units. 90 By marshalling their military prowess on behalf 
of the colonial rulers, the establishment of these new units, 
and levies, deflected them from rising against the British. 
By the time of the outbreak of mutiny, previously unruly peoples 
of the frontier were offering assistance to the British, and 
wanting to enlist in the Punjab forces. For example the "warlike" 
Mullikden Khel Afridis offered their service, and formed the 
nucleus of one of the new Punjab regiments. 
Recruitment in the Punjab was assisted greatly by the independent 
Sikh princes,who raised large numbers of Sikh levies, and was 
so successful that 18 new infantry regiments and 7,000 irregular 
cavalry were raised equalling 34,000 men and more than doubling 
the size of the old Punjab forces to 58,000 men, ma:inly·Sikhs 
and Punjabi Muslims. The "Piffers," the Punjab Irregular 
Frontier Force, formed a major part of this newly raised army, 
which included the famous Guide Corps. This Corps had been 
raised, after an idea of Henry Lawrence's, as early as 1846, 
for service in the frontier. More detail regarding the military 
situation in the Punjab at the outbreak of mutiny is discussed 
in Chapter 5, Military Situation in 1857, beginning on page 73. 




Hindustani regiments of the Bengal Army, and formed them into 
separate regiments of Punjab Infantry, the 20th, 21st and 22nd 
91 set up at Ludhiana, Ferozepur and Jullundur. The aim of this 
measure was to discourage the Sikhs from being drawn into 
mutinous action by their fellow Hindustani soldiers. 
In these new levies raised in the Punjab, the Sikh population 
was much greater than previousky. In the new Punjab foLces 
the proportion rose from about ten per cent in the ol~ ~1njab 
Irregular Face to 35 to 40 per cent in the new Punjab forces. 
In both the old and new forces, the Sikhs' portion can be 
92 estimated at about 25 per cent on average. However, accurate 
information regarding the exact number of Sikhs in the Punjab 
forces was available only from April 1858. 93 These newly 
enlisted men were to replace those disarmed and disbanded sepoy 
regiments and the soldiers sent to Delhi, to guard insecure 
and border areas, and to endeavour to maintain a peaceful 
province. The amount of new levies raised indicates that the 
British relied heavily on Punjabis for maintaining their position 
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Foot levies were also raised to support the ordinary police 
in guarding jails, ferries and forts against possible uprisings 
and escape, and to serve as recruiting depots for subsequent 
transfer to the new Punjabi regiments. 94 Among the earliest 
measures taken by the British authorities was the security of 
the forts of Phillour and Govindgarh. From these forts were 
the means of re-taking Delhi. The arsenal at Govindgarh was 
of immense importance as it was the most central stronghold 
in the Punjab. 95 The irregular levies were also employed in 
guarding the roads, especially the Grand Trunk Road, which was 
of vital importance to the British for communications from the 
Punjab and beyond, between the various military stations and 
Delhi, and to ensure the safe journey of the siege train to 
Delhi. 
With all these measures swiftly put into place, the Punjab 
administrators concentrated on maintaining the security of the 
province. Daily district reports were sent directly to the 
Judicial Commissioner, Robert Montgomery, who was centrally-
based, with the Provincial Government, in Lahore. Circulars 
were compiled in his office on a daily basis, outlining the 
general state of the province, and the latest orders from the 
Governor-General or the Chief Commissioner, and these were. 
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The use of the telegraph, a European monopoly, greatly aided 
the British efforts in crushing rebellions and maintaining a 
tranquil province. Its importance was demonstrated by the speed 
with which warnings of impending mutinies were despatched, giving 
the British the advantage of foreknowledge. Also, the censorship 
of all mail was ordered and the native press was placed under 
strict censorship. 
Compounding these repressive measures, the British maintained 
their hold over the Punjab by brutally crushing any attempt 
at revolt. Public executions were carried out against the 
perpetrators of mutiny, civil unrest, or any other crime under 
the emergency powers. Such violent examples made of rebels, 
including deserters, enabled the colonial machine to continue 
working. Swift and summary punishments meted out by the civil 
and military authorities, helped to quell incipient rebellion. 
Sometimes mutiners, or criminals. such as dacoits and highway·: 
robbers, were hanged in full view of their barracks, or of their 
villages, in order to display clearly that the British still 
had power and were, in fact, a force to be reckoned with. 97 
The official statistics of punishments carried out by the British 
authorities show the extent to which anti-British behaviour 
was firmly repressed. In the Punjab, in 1857, altogether 2-384 
people were executed and 3,244 were imprisoned, flogged or 
97 
Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 18, p332. 
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finea. 98 Two particularly brutal and appalling examples of 
punishments carried out by the British were those at Peshawar 
and Amritsar. Forty officers and men were all who remained 
of the 55th Native Infantry who had mutinied at Mardan in the 
Peshawar Division near the end of May. They fled to Swat, with 
Nicholson and his men in pursuit. There they received no 
assistance from the Akhund of Swat, who had them deported beyond 
the Indus, where they were captured by Nicholson and jailed 
in Peshawar to await their fate. 99 Other mutinous sepoys from 
the 55th had perishd in the Kaghan Valley after ferocious 
battles with the hillmen- there. These last 4 0 sepoys were blown 
from guns in front of the entire force on the parade ground, 
100 and thousands of spectators. It provided a lesson they would 
not quickly forget. In all 523 military executions were carried 
out in Peshawar for mutiny and desertion: 20 were hanged, 44 
101 blown from guns, and 459 shot by musketry. A further 277 
. . 1 t. ' d t . th t d · · · l0 2 civi execu ions were carrie ou in a ivision. 
98 
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The second example took place in the Lahore Division. At Mian 
Mir, just outside the city of Lahore, the entire regiment of 
the 26th Native Infantry murdered their European officers on 
30 July, and fled into the countryside. 103 They were caught 
up with on the banks of the Ravi River, near the tehsil of 
A. l 104 Jna a. F. Cooper, the Deputy Commissionr of Amritsar 
Districtd, forced the fugitives onto a mid-stream island where 
most were slaughtered. Those sepoys who were not killed outright, 
over 200 in all, were captured and placed in a "black hole" 
in which 45 of them subsequently died overnight, from suffocation, 
over-crowding and sheer terror. The following morning the 
· d bl f · ft at a ti'me. 105 remain er were own away rom guns in groups o en 
The summary execution carried out at Ajnala, without even a 
trial, was one of the most gruesome massacres carried out by 
the British, yet it was approved of by John Lawrence, the Chief 
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107 and Cave-Browne, the Chaplain of the Movable Column, all 
felt that a stern policy was the only safe one at this critical 
time, in order to deter further insurrection. 108 According to 
the British authorities "our critical position at this time 
justified the awful punishment of these mutineers, 237 in 
number. 11109 
Although the panic-stricken Sikh sepoys were drawn into the 
revolt of the 55th Native Infantry, on 21 May, at Mardan, they 
had their arms returned to them, in a bid by the British to 
divide and isolate the Sikh sepoys from the Hindustani sepoys. 110 
Yet the 100 Hindustani sepoys who did not desert with their 
comrades were denied the return of their arms, the excuse being 
that they wanted to join their mutinous comrades but were 





The Movable Column was an ad hoc collection of quickly raised 
units, recruited by H.B. Edwards, Commissioner of Peshawar 
Division, and trained by John Nicholson, who took over its 
command, from Neville Chamberlain, at Jullundur on 21 June. 
The Column left Peshawar on 12 June, and marched to Delhi 
to reinforce the Delhi Field Force. But its progress was 
slow as it was obliged to suppress mutinies along the way, 
including Jullundur, Phillour, Sialkot, Jhelum and Ferozepur. 
It did not reach Delhi until late August. Montgomery, pp72-73. 
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treating Sikh sepoys in a favourable manner was intended to 
prevent any concerted actions being planned by Sikhs and 
Hindustanis. Hindustani sepoys were regularly punished for 
acts of sedition, or mutiny, when, for the same activities, 
120 
SJ..kh 1 d 111 sepoys were mere y warne. Sikh sepoys had already found 
themselves ostracised by the Hindustani sepoys in the regiments 
of the Bengal Army that had Sikh recruits. These new recruits 
from the Punjab were resented by the Hindustanis, because of 
religious differences, and because of the military authorities' 
deference to the customs and dress of the Sikh sepoys. 
This policy of divide and rule, which utilised the "hereditary 
and inextinguishable aversion of the Sikhs for the Purbiah" ·· as . 
a potent weapon in the fight for supremacy was an example of 
British propaganda, which was echoed in the writings of nineteenth 
century historians who studied the Indian Mutiny. 112 However, 
the British did endeavour to exploit any rivalries, or 
differences amongst the races. During the Anglo-Sikh wars, 
Muslims, especially those from the tribal border areas, were 
recruited on the side of the British. Hindustanis also fought 
against the Khalsa Sikhs in those wars. In 1857, these Muslims 







were the enemy, too. The flagrant favouritism of the Sikh 
sepoys, over and above the Hindustani sepoys, resulted from 
political motives of the British. The potential of that great 
military force, the Khalsa Sikhs, was as yet untapped. It had 
not yet committed itself to either side, so the British were 
very keen to manipulate any latent hostilities between them 
and the rebels. These manipulative strategies of the British had 
.a _ marked effect on the population of the Punjab. Overall, 
Punjabis, including Sikhs, showed relatively little sympathy 
with the cause of the Hindustani rebels; but neither did they 
rush to the support of the British, that is, not until after 
the fall of Delhi. 
It was of paramount importance to the British to keep Sikhs, 
of all types, on their side. They realised that if the Sikh 
Sirdars and their well-trained soldiers joined the mutineers, 
the military and political consequences for British rule in 
the Punjab, indeed in all British India, would be calamitous. 114 
Not only would the British face a formidable foe once again, 
but it would have grave repercussions regarding other Punjabis, 
who would them believe that the Raj was at an end. 
Brian Montgomery asserts that the British retained the allegiance 






Richard Lawrence, Captain of Police in Amritsar, and Arthur 
Roberts, Commissioner of Lahore Division, in the Manjha. 115 
They were aided in this by the attitude of many Sikhs to the 
sepoys, mainly high caste Hindus whom they despised, and who 
comprised the majority of the Bengal Army native regiments. 
Sikhs, on the whole, did not remain loyal to the British, or 
revolt, primarily because of their economic situation. More 
important was, among other factors discussed, the violent 
response of the British to the mutiny. Their brutal reprisals 
against rebels and deserters, and other criminals, was more 
efficacious in binding them to the British. 
Nevertheless, if Delhi remained in the control of the rebels, 
it was highly probable that Sikhs, with other Punjabis, would 
have taken advantage of the weakened condition of the British, 
d b 11 d Th . t. d . ff. . l 116 an re e e . is was men ione in o icia reports, yet 
they still clung to the stance that Sikhs were loyal to the 
British because of the lenient land revenue settlements and 
other privileges given them in the years before 1857. As the 
siege of Delhi continued on into September, many people from 
all over the Punjab began to doubt the power of the British. 




P.M.R. Vol. II, Report from Montgomery to R. Temple, of the 
measures adopted by the different authorities during the 
crisis of 1857~ p364_. 
123-
Force, the British position in the Punjab, had become very 
precarious indeed. John Lawrence was concerned about the reper-
cussions if the force on the Ridge before Delhi were defeated, 
and the British had to retreat back into the Punjab. 117 The 
loyalty of the Sikhs cuuld then become doubtful as they, with 
all other Punjabis, would be induced to turn against the British 
in their weakened condition, with dire results for the British 
throughout the Punjab and, ultimately, northern India. Had 
Delhi not fallen when it did, on 20 September 1857, John Lawrence 
believed insurrections such as those at Murri and Gugera would 
h d . 11 th h t the PunJ'ab. 118 S ave occurre universa y roug ou ome 
district officers had also become aware of the precarious 
position the British found themselves in as they became bogged 
down in the fight for Delhi, with many of their men sick, 
exhausted and dying. The Deputy Commissioner of Ludhiana, G.H. 
Ricketts, firmly believed, at the time and when the crisis was 
over, that, had the rebels in Delhi held out just three weeks 
longer, risings would have occurred, in his district and others 
where there was anti-British sentiment. 119 The rebels then would 
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Meanwhile, while Sikh Jats, Khalsa Sikhs, and other Sikhs, 
especially those of the Manjha, were biding their time, awaiting 
the outcome of Delhi, one group of Sikhs was determinedly loyal 
to the British throughout; these were the outcast Sikhs, or 
Untouchables, the Mazhbi Sikhs, of the lowly sweeper caste, 
considered by many Sikhs, especially Kes dhari Sikhs, as not 
belonging to the Sikh panth at all. They had served with the 
Khalsa army, but were excluded from military service with the 
B . t. h f t. 120 ri is a ter annexa ion. Estimated by the Punjab Board of 
Administration to number 5,000, they were thrown into unemploy-
ment by this measure. Many of them, therefore, resorted to 
121 dacoity and thuggy. Severely punished for these anti-social 
activities by the British, and placed under surveillance, 1,000 
of their number were then formed into an organised body and 
1 d d d 1 t t . 122 emp oye on roa an cana cons rue ion. 
Mazhbis remained excluded from British military forces until 
1857, notwithstanding Dalhousie's viewpoint regarding them. 
He believed that they were brave and trustworthy soldiers who 
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and miners were desperately needed for the assault on Delhi, 
the Mazhbi Sikhs were recruited in conflict with earlier orders. 
They were eager to take on this work, as the majority of Mazhbis 
were still out of work. Other Sikhs ostracised them to a great 
degree. The British would not have regarded them as Sikhs for 
Sikhs to them meant Khalsa Sikhs. This 1,200 strong corps of 
sappers and miners, collected in the main from the works on 
the Bari Doab Canal, and other construction sites, 124 performed 
courageously under extremely difficult and dangerous conditions. 125 
They played a vital role in re-taking Delhi, doing the most 
dangerous jobs, including completing and repairing the batteries, 
all the while dangerously exposed to snipers from the rear and 
the rebels inside the walls of Delhi. Many were killed in11this 
duty, but details of numbers were not available, as separate 
records were not kept for Mazhbi Sikhs, and also because those 
killed were quickly replaced by relatives. This had been an 
old custom of the Khalsa army, and was also practised by the 
Sikh pioneers on the Ride before Delhi. 126 A good percentage 
of these Mazhbis had been unarmed. Without their most important 
assistance the British would have taken much longer to conquer 
Delhi, at a much higher cost in lives, or even have failed to 
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John Lawrence ordered a second Mazhbi regiment to be formed 
on 15 September 1857, at the height of the street-fighting during 
the assault on Delhi. Thereafter they were employed in the 
attack on Lucknow, where they carried out the most dangerous 
tasks unarmed, and the two Mazhbi regiments took part against 
the determined resistance in Oudh, which continued until the 
spring of 1859. 127 
Sikhs were not unique in the Punjab. The great majority of 
Sikhs supported the British, as did most Punjabis, including 
the Muslims of the North-West Frontier. 128 The number of Sikhs, 
even in the Manjha, was a small minority. Sikhs comprised just 
14% of the population of the Punjab by 1850. 129 Therefore, it 
was not unusual that they were influenced by others around them. 
This was the case also with regard to those Sikhs who did oppose 
the British. The most notorious example of this occurred at 
Sialkot, where the Sikhs involved collaborated with the 
Hindustanis. This station contained a brigade of Her Majesty's 
52nd Foot, the 35th Native Infantry, the 46th Light Infantry 
and the 9th Light Cavalry. Sialkot was also the headquarters 








Enfield rifle. When the Movable Column was formed all':uhese 
troops were withdrawn, except for the 46th and a ,Jwing of the 
9th Cavalry, all of whom mutinied on 9 July 1857. The whole 
of the civil power was suspended by the simultaneous mutiny 
of all the Indian troops still stationed at Sialkot. 130 Because 
Nicholson's Movable Column had just left Sialkot, it proved 
impossible to disarm the disaffected sepoys. Besides a party 
of military police, the British had only 200 raw Sikh recruits. 
The detachment of military police, all Hindustanis, was headed 
by Sikhs, both the Risaldar of the Mounted Police and the Subedar 
of the Infantry police. But the military police turned against 
the British. With the assistance of the principal Sikhs, the 
jail was opened, and the rising got under way properly. The 
mutinous sepoys, when fleeing, called on surrounding villages 
to take over the cantonments, which they did, apparently 
believing British rule was finished. In order to prove them 
wrong, and to restore order at Sialkot, those mutineers caught, 
including the Sikh co-conspirators, were executed. Most were 
shot immediately, with only a few selected for trial. 131 The 
130 
131 
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Sikh leaders, and the overseer of the jail was publicly hanged. 
The risk of punishing the Sikhs was considered worth the 
132 advantage of the deterrent example. The British believed such 
extreme retribution was necessary to counter the effects of 
the much deteriorated position they found themselves in at this 
stage. The hope of a quick reconquest of Delhi had 
d · d 133 Th B . t. h 1 · f t. 't d t. isappeare. e ri is po icy o preven ing uni e ac ions 
was enforced with utmost severity. Further instances of united 
actions between Hindustanis and Sikhs, or, for that matter, 
Punjabis in general, could not be found in official records. 
If they occurred at all, they were the exception to the rule. 
Generally, Punjabis, including Sikhs, sided with the British 
within the Punjab. 134 
The interesting aspect of the mutiny at Sialkot is that Sikhs 
were on both sides. Sikhs aided and abetted, and even led the 





The general situation before Delhi at the beginning of July 
1857 was thus: the British hoped to be reinforced by General 
Wheeler, who had surrendered at Cawnpore in June, then by 
General Havelock, whose force was so inferior that it could 
even proceed as far as Lucknow. Reinforcement was also. 
expected from the south, but those troops from the Madras 
Residency could get no further than Allahabad. Keith Young, 
Delhi 1857, Edited by H.W. Norman and Mrs Keith Young, London 
and Edinburgh, 1902, p60. 
Domin, pl40. 
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mutineers also consisted of Sikhs. Sikhs were instrumental 
in preventing the success of most of the incidences of rebellion 
in the Punjab, especially helping to catch the fugitive 
mutineers and deserters. 
In May 1857, when mutiny erupted throughout northern India, 
nearly one quarter of the Punjab Force was on furlough. These 
men were recalled immediately, by means of pamphlets and 
circulars sent to their villages. They supposedly rejoined 
their units "in excellent spirits~135 They were, according 
to official accounts, eager to ascertain the whereabouts of 
th . . t 136 eir regimens. But the fact is omitted in the official 
report that a considerable number of them preferred to stay 
137 away. 
Because there were so few European troops stationed in the Punjab, 
the maintenance of British rule depended to a great extent on 
Punjabi troops. In some regions there were no European at 
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. . . f. t b 13 8 an insigni ican num er. Punjabi Irregulars were brought 
in to Rawalpindi, as well as some 250 European soldiers, to 
disarm the remaining sepoys of the 14th Native Infantry, who 
decided to fight it out. About 100 Sikh and other Punjabi sepoys 
had been separated from the 14th the night before the uprising, 
and joined the British and Punjabi Irregulars against their 
139 fellow sepoys. 
Punjabi troops, which included Sikhs, played an active role 
in these important operations against the Hindustani sepoys. 
Sometimes they even decided the outcome, as in the case of Multan, 
Jhelum and Sialkot. 
Besides the mutinous actions of a number of army regiments, 
or parts of regiments, throughout the Punjab, all of which were 
successfully contained by the British, there were some incidences 
of civilian rebellion in that province. The outbreaks at Murri, 
in the far north of the Jhelum Division, and of Gugera, in the 
north-west of the Multan Division, were the two major incidences 
of civilian rebellion in the Punjab. Neither of these 
insurrections involved Sikhs. In Murri two Muslim hill tribes 
rose at the beginning of September, but were quickly quashed 
138 




by the British. 140 Near the end of September several of the 
southern Bar tribes rose at Gugera. Although the British sent 
reinforcements to quell the insurrection, the rebels retreated 
into dense bushland, as was their practice in earlier 
141 
insurrections against the Sikh government. A party of Sikh 
and European horsemen caught and killed the leader, Ahmad Khan 
Kharral, and many of his followers. But this did not halt the 
insurrection. By the end of September the whole of the district 
142 was in open revolt. The Bar tribes were finally caught up 
with and dispersed by the end of October, after they had 
plundered Kot Kamalia, in JhaqJDistrict, whence the towns-people 
joined the revolt. There they found and destroyed the account 
books of the banias in order to remove all record of their d~bts. 14 
The assistance the insurgents had expected from neighbouring 
influential Muslims, and from Delhi was not forthcoming because 
Delhi fell to the British just three days after the beginning 






P.M.R. Vol I, Report from Lieutenant Geo. Battye, Ass•istant 
Commissioner, Murri, to Captain J.E. Cracraft, Officiating 
Deputy Commissioner, Rawalpindi, 9 January 1858. pp3a0-81. 
Ibbetson, p775. 
P.M.R. Vol II, Report from Lieutenant Elphinstone, Assistant 
Commissioner [late in charge of Gugera District] to Major 
G.W. Hamilton, Commissioner and Superintendent, Multan 
Division, 30 January 1858. 
P.M.R. 1856-57 to 1857-58. p 
P.M.R. Vol II, Report from Elphinstone to Hamilton, pp51ff. 
132 
hereditary factionalism and traditional rivalries were the 
motives for the insurrection. The Upera got of Kharrals rose, 
so the Lakhera got and several other pastoral tribes retaliated 
by collaborating with the British.145 Economic conditions also 
help to explain the inconsistency of response. The rural reforms 
of the British meant that by the mid 1850s the southern Bari 
Doab was moving from pastoralism to agriculture. And the first 
summary settlements in the Gugera District, as well as the 
l l h d d f ·1 146 Th . d' t regu ar sett ement, a prove a ai ure. e imme ia e 
socio-economic results of these policies were not uniform, as 
reflected in the pattern of political response in 1851. But, 
the forced changes to the pastoralists' traditional way of life 
was the strongest impetus to revolt. 
Both the Murri and Gugera insurrections were limited-scale 




Report on the Revised Land Revenue Settlement of the Montgomery 
District in the Multan Division, Lahore 1878, pp142ff, in 
'Domin, p154. The Gugera District was later named the 
Montgomery District. 
147 
Although the Gugera insurrection was large in numbers and 
spread across the entire district, it did not extend beyond 
the district's borders. The British authorities in the 
Kangarh District of Leiah Division and the south-western 
part of Lahore Division quickly took measures to P.revent 
the rebellion from affecting their districts. P.M.R. Vol II. 
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mountainous tracts of the North-West, and in the sparsely 
populated jungles of the south. These civilian uprisings were 
elitist and conservative, and they were opportunistic as they 
saw the power and prestige of the British ebb away the longer 
they were caught up in the siege of Delhi. However, neither 
of these insurrections involved Sikhs, except for those on the 
side of the British who helped to capture the Gugera rebels. 
Besides the uprisings at Murri and Gugera in late September 
1857, the whole of Haryana was openly hostile to the British 
from the outset. 148 Also disloyal to the British were the 
populations of some of the larger cities and towns. While they 
did not actually rise up in open insurrection, they did not 
actively support the British either. These urban dwellers of 
the cities and large towns were mixed, and included many from 
Outsl.de the PunJ'ab. 149 Th t 1 1 k d th L dh' e wo examp es oo e a ere, u iana 
and Amritsar, were very important; Ludhiana, because it occupied 
a strategic position on the banks of the Sutlej commanding the 
high road from Delhi to the Punjab: and Amritsar, because it 
is a holy place for Sikhs, the home of their most sacred place, 
148 
149 
The situation in Haryana is discussed in Chapter 7, The 
Importance of Delhi. 
The city of Delhi is discussed in Chapter 7, The Importance 
of Delhi. Although Delhi was not part of the Punjab prope~-
at this time, it was of utmost importance to the British 
both strategically and psychologically. This great, historical 
city had particular influence on the eventual outcome of 
the uprising in the Punjab, and ultimatel1 throughout northern 
India. 
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the Golden Tem"9le, and the city itself is located in the Manjha. 
The only available means of communication from the North-West 
Punjab to Delhi was through Ludhiana. The transport of the 
heavy siege stores to the British camp on the Ridge before Delhi, 
from Ferozepur and Phillour, went through Ludhiana which was 
th 1 t d . h . 150 eon y rou e uring t e rainy season. 
The wealthy bankers and businessmen of the great commercial 
cities displayed a level of close-fistedness and distrust that 
indicated how little faith they had in the British capability 
151 
to overcome the rebels. Such reluctance on the part of the 
mercantile classes to raise and lend funds to the British cause, 
on contrast with the financial and material assistance, in the 
form of troops, of the independent Sikh princes, and as opposed 
to the cooperation of the majority of the rural populace, was 
viewed very unsympathetically by the British. The social 
structure of these mercantile classes had remained intact. 
Furthermore, the bankers and money-lenders had been prospering 
due to changes brought about by alterations in land policy by 
the British, which favoured the Sikh peasantry at the expense 
of the landed gentry. So, many traditional land-holders had 
to borrow to kee~ some of their lands, as jagirs were replaced 
by life-time pensions. Also, because the land revenue sett~ement 
150 
151 
P.M.R. Vol I, Re"9ort from G.H.M. Ricketts, late Deputy 
Commissioner, Ludhiana, to G.C. Barnes, Commissioner and 
Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States, 22 February 1858. pll4. 
Parliamentary 1>apers, Vol 18, 1859, p329; Cave-Browne·, Vol 
II, pp283ff. 
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demanded by the British was required to be met in cash, not 
kind, albeit comparatively lenient, peasant proprietors were 
beginning to have to borrow money in order to pay it. This 
had not got under way fully by 1857, and so there had been no 
great social turmoil in rural areas of the Punjab by that time. 
Ludhiana's weak point, from the British authorities' perspective, 
was its unruly city population, a good proportion of whom were 
foreign. They were a curious mixture of Kabul pensioners: 
Kashmiri shawl workers: Hindu Chaudhris, merchants and bankers: 
Gujurs and Syuds, the old landed proprietors of Ludhiana: and 
the mixed Muslim population of butchers, petty traders, 
152 discharged servants and camp followers. The Kabul colony 
was the source of trouble in Ludhiana. They plundered the city 
and were joined by the Kashmiris, who looted the government 
stores and burnt church and government buildings, and by the 
low caste Muslims, who frequented the bazaars in the British 
cantonments, who joined in the general disorder and pillage. 
These Muslims had been worked into a frenzy by the preaching 
of an influential Gujur moulvie. His influence spread throughout 
the district, all along the lowlands bordering the Sutlej River. 15 ~ 
The Hindu Chaudhris did not join in the destruction, but neither 
152 
153 
P.M.R. Vol I, Report from G.H.M. Ricketts, late Deputy 
Commissioner, Ludhiana, to G.C. Barnes, Commissioner and 
Superintendent, Cis-Sutlej States, 22 February 1858. pp91-95. 
Ibid, p94. 
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did they aid the British. Their influence was substantial and, 
had they wanted, they could have influenced the Hindu policy 
of the city population to side with the British. 154 They were 
inclined to back the winner in a confrontation, so long as this 
did not interfere with their own personal interests. 
The city was affected by the mutiny of the Indian troops 
stationed at Ludhiana at the outset: a small detachment of 3rd 
Native Infantry. These sepoys joined the Jullundur mutineers, 
as all the regiments in the Jullundur Doab had planned to mutiny 
simultaneously. The 4th Sikhs, who had marched into Ludhiana 
on the morning of 8 June, assisted the British, as did the troops 
of the Raja of Nabha. Those of the Maler Kotla, chiefs were 
also sent to help protect the station at Ludhiana. 155 However, 
th t f l 'ttl l ' t lSG F Ph'll ese roops were o i e rea assis ance. rom i our 
the mutineers had planned to seize Ludhiana, where they a 
expected the aid of the city population. While the Gujur 
population around Ludhiana took the opportunity to support the 
mutineers, and rustle cattle and so on, the Sikh population 
of the district sided with the British. 
The Booreahs, Harnis and Sansis, who inhabited the districts 








made use of the disturbances in Ludhiana to plunder neighbouring 
villages. 157 But, the urban Hindus, and the agricultural 
population, in general, did not side with the mutineers. 
Similarly, the old Khalsa soldiers, who were still numerous 
in all the large villages in the district, did not support the 
mutineers, but came forward to enlist for service with the 
British .. In this way, there was the possibility of retrieving 
their izzat. 
The Maharaja Patiala, the most important, influential and 
effective ally of the British in the Punjab, used his troops 
to guard the road that connected Ludhiana with Ferozepur. All 
eight routes from Ludhiana were guarded, with the aim of 
t . th t· 158 cap uring emu ineers. 
The Malwa Sikhs159 also offered their capable assistance to the 
British. They were eager and hardy soldiers. The Ferozepur 




Ibbetson, pp277-78, p283. 
P.M.R. Vol I, Report from G.H.M. Ricketts to G.C. Barnes, 
ppll0-111. 
. 
The Malwa district is in the Cis-Sutlej Division, and includes 
the tehsils of Pukohwal, Jagraon and Budhan. These Malwa 
Sikhs were Jats, and were thrifty good agriculturists and 
exporters of their own produce. They were also anxious for 
military service. They came under a stigma because they 
were believed to side with the mutineers due to the activities 
of the mutinous Ludhiana Regiment, whose troops were drawn 
from the Malwa district. Ibid, p112. 
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were especially helpful to the British. 160 
The city of Ludhiana was heavily fined, which the entire 
community had to pay. This measure subdued Ludhiana, and the 
surrounding market towns in the district. 161 The Gujur 
population was disarmed, expelled from the city and sent to 
the lowlands beyond the city environs. 162 
Located in the Lahore Division were the two largest commercial 
cities of the Punjab, Lahore and Amritsar. Amritsar, the 
religious capital, was very important as it was seen as a pivot 
which might turn the loyalty of the Khalsa one way or the other. 
When mutiny broke out in this Sikh heartland a~ong the Hindustani 
sepoys, the martial spirit of the people was rekindled. 163 
They pursued the mutineers and assisted the British in rounding 
up deserters. However, like the surrounding agricultural 
populace, almost exclusively Sikh Jats, except for the Muslims 
h d 25 t f th 1 d . Am 't o· t . t 164 h w o owne per cen o e an in ri sar is ric , t ese 
urban Sikhs were also fence-sitting, awaiting the outcome of 







Ludhiana District Gazetteer, p33. 
Parliamentary Papers, Vol 18, 1859, p335. 
Ibid, p345. 
Report on the · Revised Settlement of the Amritsar Dis-trict, 
Lahore, 1883-93, p3. 
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Although the Sikh population of Ludhiana and Amritsar were 
with the British, albeit often providing merely passive support, 
the British authorities recognised that "there must have been 
a limit to their forbearance. 11165 
Many Sikhs from the Ludhiana regiment, from Jhansi, Neemuch 
and Bareilly corps, who had been tainted by their association 
with Hindustanis in the North-Western Provinces where they had 
been stationed, were returning to their homes in the district. 166 
There, they spread rumours of the disintegrated state of the 
British strength in. the North-Western Provinces. While the 
colonial regime remained intact in the Punjab, in the North-
Western Provinces, and parts of Central India, pressure from 
the rebellious masses was so intense that the British were 
generally believed by those inhabitants, to have been eliminated 
167 for good. 









d . . 1 · d . . th . t' d 168 1s1nc ine to Join eir mu inous comra es. However, those 
cantoned outside the punjab often took part in the rising of 
their regiments. So, Sikhs were not unique, as they tended 
to respond to the unrest as did those around them. This was 
the case particularly in the North-Western Provinces. The 
principal mutinies that involved Sikhs outside the Punjab were, 
in chronological order: Jhansi, 3 June, Benares, 4 June, Jaunpur, 
5 June, Nowgong, 10 June, and Mhow, 1 July 1857. The British 
authorities believed these mutinous Sikhs had been drawn into 
the revolt at the insistence of their fellow sepoys, as they 
f d t . 1 t d t . t 169 were too ew an oo iso a e o resis . But this does not 
explain how some Sikhs come to lead the revolts of their 
regiments. Sikh sepoys of the 12th Native Infantry led their 
168 
169 
The exception to this, besides the mutiny at Sialkot already 
discussed, was the mutiny of the three Bengal regiments 
stationed at Jullundur on 7 June 1857. While some Sikh sepoys, 
along with some Hindustani sepoys, remained loyal to the 
British, others were involved in the rising, but they 
separated from the other mutineers who made for Delhi, and 
absconded to their homes in the Manjha. Ibid, pl36. They 
were quickly discovered and brought before the authorities 
at Amritsar, who, having listened to their story of how they 
were led by their comrades, liberated them without punishment 
and restored their arms to them. Cave-Browne, Vol I, p248. 
The unusual punitive measures were brought to bear on the 
Hindustani mutineers, however. This was done blatantly to 
show favour to the Sikhs, in front of their comrades, and 
therefore to isolate them from the Hindustani sepoys in order 
to prevent any united actions against the British. This 
separate and special treatment of the Sikh sepoys was intended, 
also, to attach the Sikhs, in general, to the British, because 
of the initial hesitation of some Sikhs, especially those 
in the Manjha, to side prematurely with either protagonist. 
Dr nin, pl88. 
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regiment in mutiny at Jhansi, on 3 June, and at Nowgong, on 
10 June. The 100 Sikh sepoys of this regiment were listed as 
belonging to the Cis-Sutlej Division, and to the independent 
Sikh States located in that territory. 170 The British belief 
that it was due to the small number of Sikhs in the regulars 
that they were carried along into revolt must, therefore, be 
queried. Furthermore, these Sikh sepoys originated from the 
Sikh States, the chiefs of which had wholeheartedly supported 
the British from the outset. This tends to give the impression 
that the Sikh sepoys could act on their own, without the guidance 
of their traditional leaders, in fact in direct contradiction 
to their stance. 
The most outstanding incidence of mutiny of Sikh sepoys was 
that of the Ludhiana Sikhs, who joined a general rising of the 
37th Native Infantry and the Irregular Cavalry at Benares on 
4 June. In this action official British reports state that 
the Sikhs were drawn into the "vortex of revolt," due principally 
171 to their small numbers. The official mutiny report states 





P.M.R. Vol II, Report from R. Montgomery to R. Temple, of 
the measures adopted by the different authorities during 
the crisis of 1857. p236. 
Ibid, Vol I, Report from G.H.M Ricketts to G.C. Barnes, p113. 
Mr Ricketts states that the event of the mutiny of the Ludhiana 
regiment at Benares should not be held as conclusive proof 
against them, as any man who called himself "Singh" was eligible 
for entry into the regiment as a Sikh. The Indian officers 
were almost all Hindustanis, he maintains, with the amount 
of Sikhs in the regiment numbering only 240-250 altogether. 
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other historians assert that there was a preponderance of Sikhs 
in that regiment. 173 Far from being drawn into revolt against 
their will, Domin maintains they rose in a body, when they were 
supposed to be supporting the British. To prove her point she 
quotes an eye-witness, but ignores his statement that many Sikhs 
were loyal to the British. 174 Domin believes that the majority 
of the Sikh sepoys were mutinous, and that this was proven by 
their actions after the mutiny, that is, the arrival of 300 
Sikhs from the Ludhiana regiment at Delhi on 6 August. 175 
However, she provides no evidence of prior intent to mutiny. 
While Delhi was the rallying point, the focus for revolt, many 
of the Ludhiana Sikhs returned to their homes. 
Furthermore, the Sikh treasury guard at Benares remained loyal, 
possibly due to the calming influence of the exiled Sikh leader, 
Sirdar Surat Singh. 
When the Ludhiana Sikhs joined the insurgent sepoys in Benares, 
those Sikhs who remained loyal to the British were rewarded. 
Even more important a roll of loyal Sikhs was circulated among 








would have had a salutary effect on recruits then being enlisted 
. h p . b 176 int e unJa. 
The other important centre of activities for insurgent Sikhs 
was the city of Delhi. In fact, Delhi was the focus of revolt 
to the insurgents, whether Sikh, Muslim or Hindu, from the Punjab 
and from the older provinces. While the city remained in the 
hands of the rebels it acted as a stimulus to the anti-British 
cause. The more the re-capture of Delhi was delayed, the greater 
its attraction became as the centre of the uprising. 
Many Sikhs joined the Hindustani sepoys, who had made for Delhi 
after mutinying and fleeing from their lines, and the Muslims 
fighting in Delhi under the banner of the Mughals. Although 
the number of Sikhs fighting in Delhi was small, they played 
a significant political role that surpassed their actual numbers 
several times over. 
That the British policy of separate treatment for Sikhs, in 
order to prevent united actions against them, was not universally 
successful was borne out by the fact that Muslims and Hindus 
fought alongside one another against the common foe, and many 
Sikhs joined them in the struggle. That Sikhs, albeit not in 
large numbers, fought in Delhi with the insurgents at all, 





Sikhs in Delhi formed into at least one Sikh regiment, which 
was established by 20 August 1857, just one month before Delhi 
.... ,.~"' sacked by the Br1..' t1..· sh. 177 As t th · t •~ a separa e corps ey came 1..n o 
prominence, and therefore appeared more frequently in the 
mutiny papers, which recorded who took part in daily fighting~ 78 
The strongest hopes of the Sikh insurgents in Delhi were to 
win over the Punjab. They were dismayed at the successful 
British disarming of the sepoys at Mian Mir, which foiled their 
plans to have these Bengal regiments join the anti-British ranks. 
In addition, they were very disappointed that the Phulkian 
Princes, the Sikh prices of the independent Cis-Sutlej States, 
supported the British. By August, efforts were made to encourage 
those in the Punjab to come over to their cause. While they 
received news that some Sikhs had gone into the Manjha to try 
to stir up the inhabitants to revolt, they were also told that 
Sikhs were recruited by the British as sappers and miners. 
Endeavours were made to encourage the Sikhs, and other Punjabis, 
in the Delhi Field Force to join their co-religionists in Delhi. 




These bundles of Mutiny Papers (Urdu) 1857, are a part of 
the National Archives of India, New Delhi. They detail, 
on a daily basis, the events, fighting, proclamations by 
the King of Delhi, and indeed anything that has reference 
to the months that the rebels held Delhi. 
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179 the insurgents' side in mid August. This was a time when 
the British position on the Ridge before Delhi was even worse 
than at the beginning of July, when the inhabitants of the Punjab 
were becoming aware of the weakened situation in which the 
British found themselves. However, the majority of Sikhs in 
the British camp did not change sides to fight on the side of 
the Delhi insurgents. 
The Delhi insurgents had hoped to encourage the former Khalsa 
soldiers to support 'their cause. These soldiers of the Khalsa 
army, highly trained and fit for military service, had lost 
their privileged position, and their traditional means of earning 
a living. As experienced soldiers they would have greatly aided 
the British position. But they did not immediately enlist with 
the British against the rebels. They had been kept out of the 
regular forces by John Lawrence. So, even when the British 
desperately needed Sikh recruits, including the former Khalsa 
soldiers, the latter remained aloof. More significant, however, 
is the fact that they did not support the insurgents of Delhi 
either, and seize the opportunity to overwhelm the British and 
. th . . d d 180 gain eir in epen ence. So, the great majority of Sikhs fit 
for armed service did not enrol on the side of the insurgents. 






and the ability to tip the balance of success in the direction 
of the side they supported. 
But, the Delhi insurgents, as a whole, were undermined by their 
lack of organised leadership. The Sikh rebels in Delhi did 
not intermingle with the Hindu and Muslim rebels, in that they 
fought alongside them but in their own separate groups. It 
suited them to h~ve established, several months into the siege, 
their own Sikh regiment, whence they were able to organise their 
• 
particular tactics and strategies. For there were constant 
[ 
clashes and rivalries between the former Commander-in-chief, 
the eldest son of Bahadur Shah II, Mirza Mughal, and the later 
Commander-in-chief, Bakhut Khan, who had led the Rohilkhand 
Brigade into Delhi at the beginning of July. 181 These clashes 
eventually split the army at large~ 
However, it is possible that the Sikh insurgents had their own 
personal agenda. By supporting the rebels in 1857, those Sikhs 
who desired the return of a Sikh empire may have viewed such 
support as a means to an end, to first rid themselves of the 






Conversely, it is maintained, particularly by modern Indian 
historians, that those Sikhs who joined the rebels against the 
colonial power saw themselves as participating in the greater 
fight for Indian independence, whether Muslim, Hindu or Sikh. 
M.P. Srivastava posits a nationalist uprising, that is a united, 
widespread, popular revolt against the British. 182 He maintains 
it was the first war of independence to shake off British rule. 
Srivastava, who initiated a new approach to the study of the 
Indian Mutiny by moving away from the broad overview of 
conditions and events to a district by district analysis, or 
microcosmic view, believed Nana Saheb was the principal architect 
of the ttfirst Indian freedom struggle by all the religious 
communities in India, Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, who suffered 
at the hands of the English rulers. 11183 The Indian historians 
S.N. Sen and S.B. Chaudhuri agree with the view that the mutiny 
was a national movement. 184 But a countryman of theirs, Dr R.C. 
Majumdar, does not consider the revolt a national war of 
independence.tt 185 
Nevertheless, even though those Sikhs who did fight with the 










battles because they could be identified, they were a minority 
of the population of Sikhs in the Punjab. 
While the Delhi insurgents were desperate to win over Sikhs 
from the Punjab, they were also desirous of inciting Punjabi 
Hindus and Muslims to their cause. The Punjabi Muslims were 
of particular importance because they formed the majority 
community in that province, and they provided almost half of 
the troops reunited from the Punjab by the British after 1849. 186 
Even though Bahadur Shah II, the last of the royal house of 
the Mughals, was made King of India in order to unite all Muslims 
under this revived symbol of the Mughal Empire, it actually 
found little favour with the Muslims from the western regions 
of the Punjab. The lack of collusion between Punjabi Muslims 
and their co-religionists in Delhi was a result of the attitude 
of the frontier Muslims in particular. The effete and impotent 
Mughal Emperor, restored on the throne of Delhi, and confined 
to the city, did not symbolise Islamic rule to the Pathans and 
Biloches of the frontier. 187 Although they, too, were Muslim, 
events in Delhi, and Northern and Central India, were too remote, 
geographically and ideologically, to induce them into joining 








The frontier Muslims continued to support the British through-
out the mutiny, as did the Sikhs of the Punjab, on the whole. 
The British made valiant attempts to counteract the efforts 
of the insurgents to persuade Sikhs, and other Punjabis, to 
join them. Similarly, the British tried to break the insurgents' 
hold on Delhi. Their main target was the group of Sikh 
insurgents, as it was hoped that they would capitulate first. 
But they remained with the Delhi rebels throughout the siege. 189 
The British believed that they had formed an unnatural alliance 
with the Hindustani rebels, when their natural allies were their 




Ibid; quotation from papers laid before the Commission 
appointed to enquire into the Organisation of the Indian 
Army, Appendix. Parliamentary Papers, 1859. 
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7. THE IMPORTANCE OF DELHI 
From the very outset Delhi had become the focus of the revolt, 
to the mutineers and their comrades, and to the British and 
their supporters. The fall of Delhi was the principal event 
that turned the tide of the rebellion, and changed the fortunes 
of the British, and the insurgents. The British force before 
Delhi, including the Delhi Field Force, was of paramount 
importance·to the Punjab authorities. Much of the military 
planning executed by John Lawrence was towards the goal of re-
conquering the city at all cost. He had planned to capture 
Delhi in a swift coup, but by the time of the arrival of the 
first lot of troops it was realised that the insurgents in Delhi 
were stronger and larger in numbers than at first thought. 
The small army of 4,000 men, 20 field guns and some heavy 
ordnance that was sent from Phillour, soon became entrenched 
on the Ridge before Delhi. There they remained for the next 
three months. Lawrence had to maintain this nacleus of Anglo-
Punjab force with men, munitions and supplies. 1 
So long as the British ikbal, or prestige, suffered no great 
disaster Punjabis would support the British. The Sikhs harboured 
a century-old dislike for the city of Delhi, headquarters of 





2 Sikh panth. The British, aware of the strength of feeling 
the Sikhs possessed regarding Delhi, used it to prevent any 
unity of action between Sikhs and Muslims, and to urge Sikhs 
not to join the rebels within the city. In this they failed, 
as many Sikhs did join the Hindu and Muslim rebels in Delhi. 
The city of Delhi was also an object of desire to both Sikhs 
and Punjabi Muslims, who were "fond of plunder," according to 
3 official British propaganda. The wealth of Delhi had long been 
famous, and the hope of sharing in such spoils influenced many 
to engage in service with the British during the crisis. The 
march to Delhi became a kind of popular expedition. 4 
As the months went by there was a daily cry from the Ridge for 
more men, more guns and more ammunition. The Ridge absorbed 
all field and horse batteries in the Punjab, except for those 
at Peshawar, leaving the province in a very vulnerable state, 
5 virtually denuded of European and Punjabi troops. If the 
British were defeated at Delhi, dire consequences would ensue. 





P.M.R. Vol II, Report from R. Montgomery to R., Temple, of 
the measures adopted by the different authorities during the 
crisis of 1857. p360. 
Parliamentary Papers, Vol IS, 1859. p322. 
P.A.R. 1856-57 to 1857-58, p53. 
Thorburn, p218. 
152 
up some 3,000 European troops for Delhi. 6 He was prepared to 
give up the entire Peshawar Division to Dost Mohammad, the Afghan 
ruler, with the proviso that, if he did not side with the 
mutineers, Peshawar would revert to Afghan territory, as it 
7 had been before the first Afghan War. 
The British realised that, no matter how much the rural 
population of the Punjab had been ''won over" by the British 
agrarian reforms including their "lenient" revenue settlements, 
as long as Delhi remained in the hands of the rebels a military 
and political victory over the mutineers was not possible. 8 
So important was- the recapture of Delhi to the British that 
John Lawrence seriously contemplated the abandonment of Peshawar 
in order to bring those extra reinforcements, including the 
loyal Indian troops as well as the Europeans, to the Ridge before 
Delhi. But, he was dissuaded from such a drastic strategy by 
his administrative officer,~,including Montgomery, Edwardes, 
General Cotton, who commanded the troops at Peshawar and John 
Nicholson, and, most importantly, by the Governor-General, Lord 
Canning, who had succeeded Dalhousie. 
The mutineers in Delhi had grown so strong in numbers, as they 








British foothold on the Ridge was often surrounded by the rebel 
snipers. Every action weakened the British forces without 
bringing the capture of Delhi any closer. 
In the protracted siege for Delhi there was a great need of 
cavalrymen, artillerymen, and sappers and pioneers, therefore 
John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, was compelled to alter 
his recruitment policy to allow the enlistment of Sikhs. The 
previous policy of disallowing the enlistment of old Khalsa 
Sikhs even had to be revised. Artillerymen of the former Khalsa 
army, then unemployed, were enlisted in the British service, 
about 300 of them, and sent to Delhi. 
Additional cavalry regiments were formed to replace those 
recruited into the Delhi Field Force, and another mounted unit, 
Hodson's Horse, with about 450 horsemen, mostly Sikhs, was 
established. Various Rissalas were set up with the assistance 
of the Sikh aristocrats who used their influence to induce former 
Khalsa sowars to enter the new unit. 9 As a last resort, at a 
critical time in the Punjab, Mazhbi Sikhs were enlisted as 
sappers and miners, and pioneers. They had been employed by 
the British to build canals and roads after annexation, because 
they had not been permitted into the armed forces. In the Delhi 
Field Force the first units of Mazhbis were utilised by the 




Mazhbis had been reluctant to enrol in the British forces 
besieging Delhi, having been prevented from doing so earlier 
on in the fighting, by September 1857 they displayed the same 
eagerness as other Punjabis. 
However, without the assistance of Sikhs, and Punjabis in general, 
the British position on the Ridge before Delhi would have been 
indefensible under almost insurmountable odds, and Delhi could 
not have been taken by assault. Five out of the eleven regiments 
of Punjabi infantry, and two out of five and a half regiments 
of Punjabi cavalry, took part in the final struggle at Delhi. 10 
Out of a total effective strength of about 13,000 men, only 
11 about 3,000 were European troops. In all, about 2,000 Sikhs 
took part in the assault on Delhi, and to these were added about 
3,000 men from the contingents of Patiala, Jhind and Jammu and 
Kashmir. Thus, the Sikhs constituted nearly half of the Indian 
. h h . . h 12 troops wit t e Britis , all of whom had been recruited from 
the Punjab. 13 
Sikhs from the opposite end of the social scale were also 





Parliamentary Papers, Vol 18, 1859. p310. 
Domin, pl69. 
This was a substantial contingent, when their numbers in the 
Punjab were a small minority of the whole population. 
It is difficult to distinguish accurately the number of Sikhs 
~n the Punjabi forces as Sikhs were not always identified 
as such. 
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members of the aristocracy, having remained loyal to the British 
during the second Anglo-Sikh War and having retained some of 
their former influence, also made an important military 
contribution. Sikh chiefs helped to raise Hodson 1 s Horse, which 
comprised 460 men on 11 September 1857, a few days before the 
. ld 
commencement of the assault on Delhi. This corps constituted 
almost a third of the cavalry in the Delhi Field Force. 
The large number of Punjabi recruits in the British camp outside 
Delhi resulted in a weakened British hold on the province. 
By August 1857 the situation in the Punjab was critical for 
the British. There were 6,000 armed Hindustani troops in the 
Punjab and 12,000 disarmed sepoys. Seven weakened regiments 
of European infantry, nearly half of whom were locked in the 
Peshawar Valley, were occupied mainly in guarding the disarmed 
15 sepoys. The necessity of reinforcing Delhi by this time was 
so intense that the last available European soldiers were sent 
to Delhi, under the command of General Nicholson, along with 
16 the 2nd, 4th and 7th Regiments of Punjab Infantry. 
Meanwhile, in the Manjha, Sikhs, both former Khalsa soldiers 








nor the Hindustani rebels. They awaited the outcome of the 
great battle for Delhi, as did the British representatives in 
Central India, where a speedy British victory was desperately 
hoped for in order to destroy this focus of the spreading 
rebellion. The British resident in the Mahratta state of Indore 
wrote in early June that, just a month into the siege of Delhi 
its capture by the British was urgently needed "to act as a 
sedative on clients and people and the smouldering spirit of 
17 revolt. Under the increasing impression that the British would 
be defeated finally before Delhi, uprisings and attempts to 
18 rebel extended even to the Bombay army. So, Delhi held the 
fate of the British and the insurgents. 
While Delhi was under siege it seemed to the people of the Punjab 
that the British could not sustain their power. As the months 
wore on and the rebels continued to hold Delhi, Punjabis began 
to doubt the ultimate success of the British. Troops sent from 
the Punjab to fight before Delhi left the Punjab in a weakened 
condition. Latent embers of disaffection developed, helping 
to fuel the two civilian insurrections, already discussed, at 
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the British and Punjabi forces just before any assistance could 
be provided for those insurgents by the Delhi rebels, with whom 
the Gugera rebels had been in close contact. As soon as Punjabis, 
including Sikhs, heard of the fall of Delhi, their doubts 
regarding British rule vanished, and they clamoured to enlist 
with the victor. 
Delhi Division and Haryana 
Delhi Division and Haryana had been part of the Conquered 
Districts in 1803. The territory of Haryana had been made part 
of the North-Western Provinces by Charter Act in 1833, with 
20 the headquarters at Agra. Named the Delhi Division, it 
comprised the districts of Panipat, Hissar, Delhi, Rohtak and 
Gurgaon. Delhi Division remained part of the North-Western 
Provinces until February 1858 when it and Haryana were added 
to the Punjab, because of the rebellious role they played during 
1857. 
The unsettled and rebellious nature of the inhabitants of this 
division and Haryana complicated the Delhi Field Force's 
situation before Delhi. General van Cortlandt, the former 
Sikh general, raised an irregular corps in Ferozepur, most of 




that district.21 The inhabitants of this region were 
predominantly Muslims and Hindus, with a very small population 
of Sikhs. 
The inhabitants of Delhi Division and Haryana greatly impeded 
the progress along the Grand Trunk Road of men and equipment 
moving from within the Punjab to bolster the British forces 
before Delhi. 22 With the assistance of the chiefs of Jhind and 
23 Karnal the British managed to contain the rebellious populace. 
Fortunately for the British, the rebels found no capable leader, 
and so fell to in-fighting amongst the clans, resulting in chaos 
and confusion. Organised manoeuvres on their part may have 
resulted in a different outcome at Delhi. 
The only areas that remained comparatively calm and unaffected 
were the princely States of Patiala, Jhind, Kalsia, Buria, and 
24 small jagirs in Arnbala and Thanesar. In every tehsil in the 
district of Ambala the jagirdars and petty chiefs undermined 
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The jagirdars and chiefs supported the British, as they did 
in the Punjab proper. 
General van Cortlandt's irregulars, most of whom were Sikhs, 26 
were brought into action against the people of Haryana from 
early June 1857. The original force was supplemented regularly 
so that by the time of the assault on Delhi they numbered 5,000 
27 men of all arms. Van Cortlandt and his troops brought most 
districts of Haryana and Delhi under British control by September 
1857. After the fall of Delhi, the population of these districts 
had become thoroughly demoralised, as they had envisaged the 
total elimination of the British from India. 28 Gurgaon was 
finally crushed in late November, as the rebels there had stood 
their ground as long as possible. 
The significance of Delhi cannot be under-estimated, as the 
mutiny and the British response depended on the outcome of the 
siege of that city, as did the response of the Sikhs in the 
Ptinjab. 
26 
Although this is not verifiable from records, as Sikhs were 
not distinguished from others in the Irregular Corps, it is 
certain that a l~rge pro9ortion of the irregulars were Sikhs, 
most probably mainly Mahwa Sikhs, for they were recruited.from 
predominantly Sikh areas, and those contingents provided by 






The fall of Delhi was the turning point in the Indian Mutiny. 
Although the struggle against the British lasted into the early 
months of 1859, the ascendant phase of the uprising ended with 
the re-capture of Delhi. Furthermore, with British ikbal 
restored, Sikhs of all types clamoured to their side. The Punjab 
became an ideal recruiting centre, from where Punjabis, 
particularly the experienced Sikh and Muslim soldiers, including 
former Khalsa soldiers, were enlisted by the British. 
All those who had, from the beginning, not decided which side 
to back, now supported the British as the fall of Delhi contained 
some sort of symbolic significance for all Punjabis. 
After the Fall of Delhi 
Although at first the British were too nervous to enlist former 
Khalsa soldiers, their attitude began to change dramatically 
due to the support the British received from the Sikh princes 
d . h t· 29 uring t emu iny. For the British, martial Sikhs equalled 
Khalsa Sikhs, so all who were enlisted into the Indian Army 
30 after the Mutiny were required to display the Khalsa symbols. 
After the immediate crisis in the Punjab was over, once they 
had proven their loyalty by not rising en masse against the 
29 
McLeod, Who is a Sikh? p70. 
30 
Ibid; Kushwant Singh, Vol II, pll3. 
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British, ex-Khalsa soldiers began to be enrolled into the British-
controlled armed forces. Frequently they were inducted into 
the forces which were sent into Central India to suppress the 
sporadic outbreaks of rebellion that continued there until the 
end of 1858. Many Sikhs had had the advantage of having been 
trained according to European military methods. 
Sikhs, even more popular than before with the British, were 
rewarded for their loyalty. Rewards included titles, military 
honours, cash khil'ats or presentations, jagirs, pensions and 
land grants. Sikhism was on the increase as it was rapidly 
becoming a popular religion due to its being favoured by the 
ruling British, just as Sikhism had been the popular religion 
under Sikh rule. 31 Sikhs saw themselves as powerful, like the 
British; they were a privileged race in the Punjab, had fought 
on the winning side, and were now rewarded, had certain rights, 
and were employed in large numbers in the army. After 1858, 
a lot of those peasants recruited as additional soldiers remained 
in permanent employment in acknowledgement of the supportive 
role the rural masses played during the mutiny, by the colonial 
government. At the same time, the British rewarded the old 
Sikh aristocracy, in gratitude for their loyalty, but more 
importantly in an effort to create a balance in the province 
31 
P.A.R. 1856-57 to 1857-58, p55. 
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between the upper classes and the masses. Because of their 
attitude during the 1857 rebellion, Sikhs of all classes 
continued to belong to a privileged section of the community. 
It is evident that without the active support of Sikhs, of all 
sections of the panth, before Delhi the British could not have 




Sikh participation was especially significant during the 
Indian Mutiny of 1857-59. They held a privileged and powerful 
position in the Punjab, primarily due to having been favoured 
by Ranjit Singh's government. This situation was reinforced 
by the British who, after originally causing a reversal in 
Sikh fortunes, 1 continued certain of the Sikh government's 
economic and fiscal policies with the aim of improving the 
conditions of Sikh Jats. The British administrators, in 
tune with English economic policies of the day, were 
interested in producing a stable yet productive rural economy. 
In order to achieve this, they looked to the productive forces 
in the land, the rural peasant proprietor who was not 
inhibited by status restrictions and social mores. Sikh 
Jats had proved the most industrious and enterprising of 
all cultivators, so the British reinforced their rights and 
privileges, often at the expense of the nobility. Their lack 
of prejudice at taking up the plough, which had inhibited 
the progress of such communities of high social. statua 
as Rajputs, who would rather lose their land even, than risk 
undermining their caste by using the plough, assured them of 
the continuation of their privileged position. 
Of the basic factors at work in 1857, affecting rural masses 




of the British to sanction the existing status of ownership 
in agriculture by law, and to assess a relatively moderate 
land tax. Early over-assessment was promptly rectified at 
the behest of the agriculturists protestations, therefore 
grave hardships, as in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, 
were avoided or quickly remedied in the Punjab. 2 Thus, the 
peasantry in the Punjab lived and worked in better conditions 
than in the older provinces. This was due as much from the 
militant ,attitude of the Punjab rural masses, sadly lacking 
in the older provinces, as from changes taking place in 
British society. 
The fiscal moderation of the Provincial Government in regard 
to the levying of land tax was not purely altruistic, but 
was due to the impracticability of obtaining high monetary 
assessments from the Punjab rural community. 3 
However, the fact that the Sikhs in the Punjab experienced better 
conditions than the rural masses in the older provinces does 
not mean this was the reason they did not break into open 
rebellion. Eric Stokes supplies a very good argument that 
negates the importance of a beneficent government~ and firmly 








these included the importance of traditional leaders and ties 
of allegiance; local and regional rivalries; and, most important, 
the removal of status, prestige and lordship rights of the 
traditional elites. 
While there were Sikhs who fought against the British, they 
were not in numbers large enough to make a great difference, 
either to the outcome, or to influence those Sikhs passively 
or actively supportive of the British. Sikh sepoys, stationed 
in the North-Western Provinces, mutinied with their 
Hindustani counterparts, at Jhansi, Nowgong, Mhow, and at Benares, 
where Sikhs made up the majority of the regiment, and mutinied 
5 as a body. This disproves the theory of ·the British authorities, 
just after the mutiny, that the Sikhs were drawn into the vortex 
of revolt by the Hindustani sepoys putting pressure on the Sikhs. 6 
The theory, supported by British propagandists, that because 
the Sikhs, on the whole, did not rebel against the British they 
had no intention of doing so is disproven by the realisation, 
acknowledged in the official report, that, had Delhi not fallen 
when it did, it was highly probable that allof the Punjab, 
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Overall, the majority of Sikhs, civilian and military, actively 
supported the British, and played a decisive role in the outcome 
of the mutiny. Those who neither supported nor fought against 
the British, joined the pro-British forces once Delhi had fallen 
to the British. 
Compared with other communities the Sikhs had the largest 
proportion of peasants and therefore gained most by the British 
policy of supporting those who actually tilled the soil. Sikh 
peasants were in a better situation because of privileges 
resulting from their former dominant position in the Sikh state, 
which was legalised by civil law after annexation. Accordingly, 
their community had the highest percentage of proprietors. 7 
The privileged position of Sikh peasants seemed even stronger 
than before, while the rural masses as a whole did not yet face 
poverty or the alternative of overthrowing the colonial 
government, as did the peasantry of the North-Western Provinces. 
There had been some unfortunate transfers of individual 
properties, but such cases were exceptional among agriculturists 
at least. 8 
The British support of peasant proprietors, Sikh Jats in the 
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and other aspects of their economic policy, did not influence 
one way or the other the response of this group. A case can 
be made that it figured to some degree, as Sikhs, as a whole, 
did not rise against the foreign ruler. But the facts point 
to the possibility, even the probability according to some 
writers, that large numbers of Sikhs would have rebelled if 
Delhi had not fallen to the British when it did. 9 
The moderate land tax demanded by the British from the Punjab 
peasantry was at the expense of che aristocracy. British 
anti-feudal policy was in accordance with new directions 
directed from England. The jagirdars were very unhappy with 
the system of land assessment, for it deprived them of their 
b . th ' t lO ar itrary power over e proprie ors. They could no longer 
interfere in matters of land proprietorship, further eroding 
the social basis of the jagirdars' influence. The village 
communities then had the right, by law, to be left to 
themselves. When cash pensions were paid in the place of 
jagirs, they completely disconnected the link between peasants 
and jagirdars. 
9 
P.M.R. Vol II, Narrative of the Mutiny in the Punjab and comments 
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Measures were taken in the Punjab to avoid such disintegration 
of the old agrarian structure, as experienced in the North-
Western Provinces. The land tax was reduced, therefore the 
peasant was relatively free from indebtedness, joint 
responsibility was reimposed, and the pre-emptive right of 
11 village communities was preserved. So, those factors which 
caused acute distress in the North-Western Provinces were largely 
lacking in the Punjab, by 1857. 
While the impact of forced land sales and increased indebtedness 
was greater in the older provinces than in the Punjab, it does 
not follow that this was the reason Sikhs, whose loss of lands 
through forced sales was uncommon by 1857, did not rebel against 
the British. 
More important is the perception of grievances, and the fitness 
of the community to rebel. Those most affected in the North-
Western Provinces were not necessarily those who rebelled. 
In fact, those who rebelled were from areas where the revenue 
d d 1 . h 12 eman was ig test. The British policy pre-1857 of 
supporting the peasantry at the expense of the aristocracy was 
based on faulty reasoning, according to Arthur Brandreth, Settle-
ment Officer for the Jhelurn District. 
After the mutiny he had become convinced that revenue reductions 






futile,:, for they wasted the government's resources without 
permitting such land improvements that would result from lenient 
settlements with large land-holders. Furthermore, and perhaps 
more important in the light of 1857, such settlements did not 
guarantee the contentment of the region, nor did they bind the 
people to the British government. Small holders exerted no 
influence over their countrymen, and could not be relied upon 
to assist the British in a crisis, whereas large land-holders, 
the traditional elites, wielded considerable influence, and 
would use it either for or against the British. 13 
This shows that some contemporary British officials came to 
understand that the response to 1857 did not depend upon their 
good government and lenient revenue demands. 
When considering the attitude of the Sikhs towards the British 
during the uprising, Punjabi Muslims and Hindus must also 
' 
be judged by the same criteria. They were both in the Punjab 
forces in much greater numbers than Sikhs. The attitude, and 
actions, of the Sikhs, therefore, must be seen in relation to 
the overall attitude of Punjabis. 
Upon the outbreak of mutiny, the measures taken by the British 
to quell any dissent, were swfft and brutal. These were 
intended to deter would-be rebels and set examples. Those 
13 
Van den Dungen, The Punjab Tradition. p33. 
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Sikhs as yet undecided were therefore deterred from joining 
the rebels. The Commissioner of the Punjab, John Lawrence, 
emphasised that there was sufficient force in the Punjab to 
crush all mutineers. 14 The swift disarming of the regular Bengal 
regiments stationed in the Punjab, and the general disarming 
policy that was extended throughout the Punjab, following the 
outbreak of rebellion, was also instrumental in deterring 
organised insurrection in that province. 
The British policy of separate and special treatment of Sikhs 
in 1857 was a continuation of the policies initiated by Ranjit 
Singh that particularly favoured Sikh Jats. Furthermore, the 
derogatory term Purbiah was revived at this time to reinforce 
the enmity between Sikhs and Hindustani sepoys, who had fought 
on the side of the British against the Sikh army during the 
Sikh wars. This attitude was exploited by the British to deepen 
district among Indians, and therefore to prevent the possibility 
of united actions against the British, thereby strengthening 
the British position. 15 The ;B~itish . authorities in the 
Punjab stimulated this mutual animosity by offering rewards 
for the capture of Hindustani sepoys. 16 
14 
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At the outbreak of the uprising the social structure of 
Punjabi society had hardly been altered. Even the aristocracy 
had retained some means of existence. However, the prevention 
by the British of acute distress to the peasant proprietor, 
resulting in the passive attitude of Punjabis, and 
particularly of Sikhs, during the uprising, did not result in 
a sympathetic attitude to the colonial government. While there 
was no heartfelt loyalty, there also was no animosity towards 
.. h . h 17 the Britis eit er. 
The position of the former Khalsa soldiers, who had lost their 
privileges and traditional employment, is more difficult to 
understand. They were not recruited in large numbers until 
after the fall of Delhi. However, they did not support the 
insurgents either. They had fought the British twice and 
sustained great losses. The pressure of the Sikh masses was 
not there to induce the ex Khalsa to join the anti-British 
forces, nor was there a Sikh leader of power and influence to 
rally the Sikhs. 18 
The predominance of peasant proprietors who cultivated their 
own land was one of the peculiarities of Punjabi society that 
resulted form the militant Sikh Jat movement of a century 
19 before. British support of actively farming peasants in general 
17 
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meant they first of all favoured the Jats who were the 
backbone of the Sikh community. 20 But, as Stokes asserts, this 
in itself is not a sturdy enough reason, nor is it proven, for 
not rising against the British. This is borne out by the fact 
that, in the initial stages of the rebellion, Sikhs in general 
did not support either protagonist. They could afford to wait 
and see who would become the ultimate victor before they chose 
sides. For, conversely, in those cases where civilian rebellion 
erupted, notably in Murri and Gugera, and also in Julllundur, 
there had not been a great rate of alienation of landed property. 
In Kot Kamalia, where the populace rose against the banias and 
destroyed their account books in order to wipe out any evidence 




So, by maintaining the privileged position of Sikh Jats after 
annexation of the Punjab and enabling them to further improve 
their situation, the British believed they would collaborate 
with them against their traditional enemies, the Muslims, who 
in past centuries had persecuted them and tried to convert them, 
and the Hindustanis, whom Sikhs tended to despise in their 
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who had helped the British to rid them of their independence. 
Agricultural Sikhs, ex Khalsa Sikhs, and even the low caste 
Sikhs were aware of the power of the British, and would have 
required a much greater impetus to revolt than was available. 
But they did not remain loyal to the British for sentimental 
reasons. To back the Muslims· or Hindustani rebels was merely 
to replace the foreign ruler with another. 
The various measures taken by the British authorities during 
the mutiny, including their punitive measures, their disarmament 
programme and their province-wide recruitment drive, also helped 
to win over most Sikhs. 
The most important single factor, though, was the restoration 
of British power and prestige in the eyes of Sikhs when the 
British forces re-took the city of Delhi. 
So, in conclusion, the majority of Sikhs were loyal to the British 
in 1857 because it suited them, not because of any heartfelt 
alliance. Also, they lacked the cohesion and leadership to 
organise a full-scale attack on the British overlords. 
Besides, some Sikhs were not loyal to the British, but rallied 
to the defence of Delhi with British and Muslim insurgents., 
Overall, Sikhs tended to respond in the manner that those around 
them, i.e. other Punjabis, responded. 
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For the remaining months of 1857, after the fall of Delhi, Sikhs 
of all walks of life were indeed loyal to the British, and 
greatly helped suppress rebellion in the older provinces where 
incidences of mutinous action continued until the early months 
of 1859. 
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